Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Essays in corporate risk management

This research investigates the factors that lead Latin American non-financial firms to manage risks using derivatives. The main focus is on currency risk management. With this purpose, this thesis is divided into an introduction and two main chapters, which have been written as stand-alone papers. The first paper describes the results of a survey on derivatives usage and risk management responded by the CFOs of 74 Brazilian non-financial firms listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), and the main evidence found is: i) larger firms are more likely to use financial derivatives; ii) foreign exchange risk is the most managed with derivatives; iii) Brazilian managers are more concerned with legal and institutional aspects in using derivatives, such as the taxation and accounting treatment of these instruments, than with issues related to implementing and maintaining a risk management program using derivatives. The second paper studies the determinants of risk management with derivatives in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). I investigate not only the decision of whether to use financial derivatives or not, but also the magnitude of risk management, measured by the notional value of outstanding derivatives contracts. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to use derivatives holdings information in emerging markets. The use of a multi-country setting allows the analysis of institutional and economic factors, such as foreign currency indebtedness, the high volatility of exchange rates, the instability of political and institutional framework and the development of financial markets, which are issues of second-order importance in developed markets. The main contribution of the second paper is on the understanding of the relationship among currency derivatives usage, foreign debt and the sensitivity of operational earnings to currency fluctuations in Latin American countries. Unlikely previous findings for US firms, my evidence shows that derivatives held by Latin American firms are capable of producing cash flows comparable to financial expenses and investments, showing that derivatives are key instruments in their risk management strategies. It is also the first work to show strong and robust evidence that firms that benefit from local currency devaluation (e.g. exporters) have a natural currency hedge for foreign debt that allows them to bear higher levels of debt in foreign currency. This implies that firms under this revenue-cost structure require lower levels of hedging with derivatives. The findings also provide evidence that large firms are more likely to use derivatives, but the magnitude of derivatives holdings seems to be unrelated to the size of the firm, consistent with findings for US firms.

The macroeconomic effects of infrequent information with adjustment costs

We extend the macroeconomic literature on Sstype rules by introducing infrequent information in a kinked ad justment cost model. We first show that optimal individual decision rules are both state-and -time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. In our model, a vast number of agents act together, and more so when uncertainty is large.The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. These results are in contrast with those obtained with full information ad justment cost models.

The macroeconomics of price adjustments under information frictions and menu costs

Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.