Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation : an experimental study

We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters’ decisions. We do so in a participation game, where some voters (‘receivers’) are told about some other voters’ (‘senders’) turnout decision at a first stage of the game. Cases are distinguished where the voters support the same or different candidates or where they are uncertain about each other’s preferences. Our experimental results show that such information matters. Participation is much higher when information is exchanged than when it is not. Senders strategically try to use their first mover position and some receivers respond to this.

A internet como ferramenta para venda de veículos: o caso Vitória Webcar

A possibilidade de interagir em tempo real com o consumidor, ao contrário dos monólogos que normalmente caracterizam os tradicionais meios de marketing, alterou drasticamente o jeito como o Customer Service pode ser oferecido, pois permite pesquisas e compras de produtos e serviços on-line, o que representa um maior conforto para o homem contemporâneo, cujo tempo é bem escasso. O mercado representa um papel central na economia de qualquer nação, facilitando a troca de informações, bens, serviços e pagamentos, além de criar valores econômicos para compradores, vendedores, intermediários e para a sociedade de modo geral. Os mercados provêem a infra-estrutura física que permite que as transações entre os compradores e os vendedores ocorram. Dessa forma, entende-se que Mercado e Negociação eletrônica são especializações dos conceitos gerais de Mercado e Negociação. O uso de meios eletrônicos e, mais especificamente, o uso da Internet como recurso para promover o comércio, tem revolucionado todas as formas de comercialização existentes, promovendo o surgimento de novos tipos de mercados eletrônicos, os mercados baseados em Internet. Com tais vantagens, os mercados eletrônicos geram novas oportunidades de negócios, proporcionam novas estratégias para se atingir o consumidor, o fornecedor e os intermediários que estejam dispostos a somar valores na integração cliente/fornecedor. Mercados eletrônicos melhoram as informações compartilhadas entre compradores e fornecedores e ajudam a reduzir o custo de logística permitindo promoções rápidas, entregas imediatas e inventários reduzidos. É a infra-estrutura da informação substituindo sistemas de distribuição física. Foi, portanto, sobre esta temática que buscou-se desenvolver todo o trabalho de pesquisa, enfocando-se um caso real: Vitória Web Car, por ser uma organização que direcionou o seu foco para a qualidade dos serviços, como base para o seu crescimento e diferenciação no mercado do varejo virtual brasileiro.

Precificação em orquestradores de informação: maximizando redes estáveis

Em redes de inovação baseadas em trocas de informação, o agente orquestrador se apropria das informações dos atores periféricos, gera inovação e distribui em forma de valor agregado. É sua função promover a estabilidade na rede fazendo com que a mesma tenha taxas não negativas de crescimento. Nos mercados de análise de crédito e fraude, por exemplo, ou bureaus funcionam como agentes orquestradores, concentrando as informações históricas da população que são provenientes de seus clientes e fornecendo produtos que auxiliam na tomada de decisão. Assumindo todas as empresas do ecossistema como agentes racionais, a teoria dos jogos se torna uma ferramenta apropriada para o estudo da precificação dos produtos como mecanismo de promoção da estabilidade da rede. Este trabalho busca identificar a relação de diferentes estruturas de precificação promovidas pelo agente orquestrador com a estabilidade e eficiência da rede de inovação. Uma vez que o poder da rede se dá pela força conjunta de seus membros, a inovação por esta gerada varia de acordo com a decisão isolada de cada agente periférico de contratar o agente orquestrador ao preço por ele estipulado. Através da definição de um jogo teórico simplificado onde diferentes agentes decidem conectar-se ou não à rede nas diferentes estruturas de preços estipuladas pelo agente orquestrador, o estudo analisa as condições de equilíbrio conclui que o equilíbrio de Nash implica em um cenário de estabilidade da rede. Uma conclusão é que, para maximizar o poder de inovação da rede, o preço a ser pago por cada agente para fazer uso da rede deve ser diretamente proporcional ao benefício financeiro auferido pela inovação gerada pela mesma. O estudo apresenta ainda uma simulação computacional de um mercado fictício para demonstração numérica dos efeitos observados. Através das conclusões obtidas, o trabalho cobre uma lacuna da literatura de redes de inovação com agentes orquestradores monopolistas em termos de precificação do uso da rede, servindo de subsídio de tomadores de decisão quando da oferta ou demanda dos serviços da rede.

Does mixed frequency vector error correction model add relevant information to exchange misalignment calculus? Evidence for United States

Real exchange rate is an important macroeconomic price in the economy and a ects economic activity, interest rates, domestic prices, trade and investiments ows among other variables. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that it is possible to calculate the misalignment from a mixed ointegrated vector error correction framework. An empirical exercise using United States' real exchange rate data is performed. The results suggest that the model with mixed frequency data is preferred to the models with same frequency variables

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Assessing interdependence among countries' fundamentals and its implications for exchange rate misalignment estimates: An empirical exercise based on GVAR

Exchange rates are important macroeconomic prices and changes in these rates a ect economic activity, prices, interest rates, and trade ows. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that the global vector autoregressions model (GVAR) proposed by Pesaran and co-authors can add relevant information to the literature on measuring exchange rate misalignment. Our empirical exercise suggests that the estimate exchange rate misalignment obtained from GVAR can be quite di erent to that using the traditional cointegrated time series techniques, which treat countries as detached entities. The di erences between the two approaches are more pronounced for small and developing countries. Our results also suggest a strong interdependence among eurozone countries, as expected

The Brazilian foreign exchange market through the microstructure perspective

The objective of this study is to investigate whether the relationship between order ow and the spot exchange rate stems from the fact that the ow aggregates information on dispersed economic fundamentals in the economy. To perform this test, a database that includes all transactions of the commercial and nancial segments of the Brazilian primary foreign exchange market between January of 1999 and May of 2008 was used. We show that the order ow was partly responsible for variations in in ation expectations over the time period and that this relationship did not remain robust, drawing comparisons with other fundamentals such as GDP and Industrial Production.

Addressing important econometric issues on how to construct theoretical based exchange rate misalignment estimates

Exchange rate misalignment assessment is becoming more relevant in recent period particularly after the nancial crisis of 2008. There are di erent methodologies to address real exchange rate misalignment. The real exchange misalignment is de ned as the di erence between actual real e ective exchange rate and some equilibrium norm. Di erent norms are available in the literature. Our paper aims to contribute to the literature by showing that Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER) adopted by Clark & MacDonald (1999), Ubide et al. (1999), Faruqee (1994), Aguirre & Calderón (2005) and Kubota (2009) among others can be improved in two following manners. The rst one consists of jointly modeling real e ective exchange rate, trade balance and net foreign asset position. The second one has to do with the possibility of explicitly testing over identifying restrictions implied by economic theory and allowing the analyst to show that these restrictions are not falsi ed by the empirical evidence. If the economic based identifying restrictions are not rejected it is also possible to decompose exchange rate misalignment in two pieces, one related to long run fundamentals of exchange rate and the other related to external account imbalances. We also discuss some necessary conditions that should be satis ed for disrcarding trade balance information without compromising exchange rate misalignment assessment. A statistical (but not a theoretical) identifying strategy for calculating exchange rate misalignment is also discussed. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by analyzing the Brazilian case. We show that the traditional approach disregard important information of external accounts equilibrium for this economy.

Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.