4 resultados para Incentives in conservation of natural resources
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.
Resumo:
Single ownership of natural resources is conunon in many developing countries and socialist economies. The sole owner is usually the .state or society at large, and governments are responsible for either distributing exploitation rights or engaging in exploitation through their own corporations. • Under this circumstance, the notion of externality may not fully explain pollution problems existent in these nations. This paper studies the case where a single agent owns both exhaustible and renewable resources, and attempts to maximize its welfare. The resources are either perfect or imperfect substitutes. Initially, exhaustible resource extraction does not affect the renewable resource, and sustainable growth is attainable. A lactor of pollution flowing from the extraction of the nc.nrenewable resource into the growth of the renewable resource is introduced. The continuous exploitation of the exhaustible resource leads to the " optimal " extinction of the renewable resource, and sustainable growth is no longer reached. Regulation from a supra governmental agency such as an multinational institution may prove to be of utmost importance, if sustainability is to be achieved. The paper is divided into five sections. Section two provides a brief survey of the relevant literature. Section three presents the model without pollution. This factor is introduced in section four. The final section discusses some possible approaches for attaining sustainable growth, and contains the concluding remarks .
Resumo:
Lucas (2000) estimates that the US welfare costs of inflation are around 1% of GDP. This measurement is consistent with a speci…c distorting channel in terms of the Bailey triangle under the demand for monetary base schedule (outside money): the displacement of resources from the production of consumption goods to the household transaction time à la Baumol. Here, we consider also several new types of distortions in the manufacturing and banking industries. Our new evidences show that both banks and firms demand special occupational employments to avoid the inflation tax. We de…ne the concept of ”the foat labor”: The occupational employments that are aflected by the in‡ation rates. More administrative workers are hired relatively to the bluecollar workers for producing consumption goods. This new phenomenon makes the manufacturing industry more roundabout. To take into account this new stylized fact and others, we redo at same time both ”The model 5: A Banking Sector -2” formulated by Lucas (1993) and ”The Competitive Banking System” proposed by Yoshino (1993). This modelling allows us to characterize better the new types of misallocations. We …nd that the maximum value of the resources wasted by the US economy happened in the years 1980-81, after the 2nd oil shock. In these years, we estimate the excess resources that are allocated for every speci…c distorting channel: i) The US commercial banks spent additional resources of around 2% of GDP; ii) For the purpose of the firm foating time were used between 2.4% and 4.1% of GDP); and iii) For the household transaction time were allocated between 3.1% and 4.5 % of GDP. The Bailey triangle under the demand for the monetary base schedule represented around 1% of GDP, which is consistent with Lucas (2000). We estimate that the US total welfare costs of in‡ation were around 10% of GDP in terms of the consumption goods foregone. The big di¤erence between our results and Lucas (2000) are mainly due to the Harberger triangle in the market for loans (inside money) which makes part of the household transaction time, of the …rm ‡oat labor and of the distortion in the banking industry. This triangle arises due to the widening interest rates spread in the presence of a distorting inflation tax and under a fractionally reserve system. The Harberger triangle can represent 80% of the total welfare costs of inflation while the remaining percentage is split almost equally between the Bailey triangle and the resources used for the bank services. Finally, we formulate several theorems in terms of the optimal nonneutral monetary policy so as to compare with the classical monetary theory.
Resumo:
This research used documentary analysis to identify the main natural disasters in Brazil in the last decade (2003 to 2013). Results provided evidence that operations and impacts differ in sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters and that Government is the main player in the Humanitarian Operations in Brazi