Organizational design and incentive provision

We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.

Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Financial distress as a collapse of incentive scheme

This paper explaina why workers lack motivation near bankruptcy, why they tend to leave companies in financiai distreas, and why thoae who remam require higher compensation. Theae indirect costa of financiai diatresa adie becauae the optimal combination of debt and incentive achem.ea, deaigned to minimize agency costa, ends up underpaying managers when there ia a bankruptcy threat. The paper a1so providea new empirica1 implications on the intera.ction between financiai reatructuring and changea in managerial compensation. Theae predictions are supported by the findings of Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992).

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Empresas como agentes de benefício para o mundo: reflexão sobre visões de futuro no Brasil

O objetivo desta pesquisa consistiu em explorar os fatores comuns das visões de futuro de três segmentos da comunidade paulistana (executivos, empreendedores sociais e pensadores), especialmente no que diz respeito às possíveis alianças cooperativas entre o mundo dos negócios e a sociedade como um todo, como também as estratégias utilizadas para concretizá-las. Indagamos se, com suas experiências de vida, os sujeitos entrevistados protagonizavam suas visões de futuro; quais eram os aspectos em comum dessas visões referentes ao futuro e ao futuro dos negócios; as estratégias utilizadas para concretizar essas visões comuns, percebidas como positivas, e de que maneira podiam contribuir para o desenvolvimento de uma relação cooperativa entre os negócios e a sociedade. Utilizamos 30 entrevistas (10 em cada segmento), em amostra acidental, gravadas e, posteriormente, submetidas a uma análise segundo o referencial da Psicologia Social de Enrique Pichon-Rivière, incluindo alguns dos indicadores do processo interacional (cooperação, comunicação e telecomunicação) e da reação dos entrevistados e entrevistadores com relação aos conteúdos aplicados (transferência e contratransferência). Baseamo-nos no protocolo de Investigação Apreciativa do projeto "Business as an Agent of World Benefit" da Weatherhead School of Management e conceitos convergentes com o referencial adotado no que se refere ao interjogo entre o homem e o mundo, o protagonismo, o contar histórias, o projeto como planejamento de futuro e a criação de novas metáforas. Com relação ao futuro imaginado, encontramos como resultado unânime a preocupação com o meio ambiente, a mudança de valores (com a revisitação da noção de bem-estar, as “mortes subjetivas” por preconceito, o acolhimento expandido aos profissionais da saúde e a saúde como valor); a interconexão (presente no mundo contábil, nos modelos econômicos equitativos, na visão do administrador como estadista, na integração entre o “dentro e fora do negócio”, na consciência da riqueza como medida global e não individual, na ética, no voluntariado por consciência, no cuidado com o ambiente, consigo mesmo, com o outro e com a vida e a morte); coerência, vínculo e escuta (com foco na qualidade das relações e não na tecnologia, no honrar o próximo, no compartilhamento de experiências, na mão dupla entre negócios e comunidade, no bom trato para com as crianças e adultos), inclusão/exclusão (com a criação de espaços públicos intencionalmente inclusivos e a real inclusão dos excluídos na empresa); a educação (através do raciocínio que lide com a linearidade vigente e estimule pensar na complexidade, do reconhecimento de aspectos saudáveis e construtivos no cotidiano, e da formação que abrange gerentes, empreendedores e comunidade, incluindo conhecimento, ética e gratidão); interioridade (alma do negócio, intuição, transcendência como diferencial influindo em uma nova percepção de lucro, sacralidade da vida, encontro consigo próprio); lucro (revisão desse conceito com foco na vida, no bem-estar, no enraizamento das pessoas); consumo/consumidor (com relação à mudança na forma de analisar investimentos inteligentes, uma nova visão de pobreza); longo prazo (ligado à sustentabilidade, à autovalorização das pessoas e à educação dos funcionários). Há muitas estratégias atuantes nos diferentes segmentos, as pensadas são: a intencionalidade de inclusão em espaços públicos por diversos agentes, a revisão do conceito de bem-estar, os benefícios compartilhados, a inclusão mais precoce do jovem no mundo dos negócios e não como forma de exploração, o incentivo às atitudes de liderança nos jovens para o novo mundo e o longo prazo, como tema a ser mais aprofundado. Quanto à relação entre negócios e sociedade parece não haver clareza entre os segmentos quanto ao papel desempenhado pelas empresas, pelas ONGs e pelas comunidades. Surgem pontos como a necessidade da expansão de idéias inovadoras por meio de instituições sem fins lucrativos, do fortalecimento da sociedade civil, de um novo conceito de organização social, das ONGs não serem mais necessárias, das comunidades solidárias como instituições de direito e da ampliação do sentido da responsabilidade social estendido ao ecossistema.

The risk-incentive trade-off in competitive search

Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.

Incentive-driven inattention

Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia