Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

A simple demonstration of the existence of the jordan canonical form for any square matrix

All the demonstrations known to this author of the existence of the Jordan Canonical Form are somewhat complex - usually invoking the use of new spaces, and what not. These demonstrations are usually too difficult for an average Mathematics student to understand how he or she can obtain the Jordan Canonical Form for any square matrix. The method here proposed not only demonstrates the existence of such forms but, additionally, shows how to find them in a step by step manner. I do not claim that the following demonstration is in any way “elegant” (by the standards of elegance in fashion nowadays among mathematicians) but merely simple (undergraduate students taking a fist course in Matrix Algebra would understand how it works).

Evaluating the existence of structural change in the brazilian term structure of interest: evidence based on cointegration models with structural break

This paper investigates whether there is evidence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. Multivariate cointegration techniques are used to verify this evidence. Two econometrics models are estimated. The rst one is a Vector Autoregressive Model with Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) with smooth transition in the deterministic coe¢ cients (Ripatti and Saikkonen [25]). The second one is a VECM with abrupt structural change formulated by Hansen [13]. Two datasets were analysed. The rst one contains a nominal interest rate with maturity up to three years. The second data set focuses on maturity up to one year. The rst data set focuses on a sample period from 1995 to 2010 and the second from 1998 to 2010. The frequency is monthly. The estimated models suggest the existence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure. It was possible to document the existence of multiple regimes using both techniques for both databases. The risk premium for di¤erent spreads varied considerably during the earliest period of both samples and seemed to converge to stable and lower values at the end of the sample period. Long-term risk premiums seemed to converge to inter-national standards, although the Brazilian term structure is still subject to liquidity problems for longer maturities.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Existence and uniqueness of a fixed-point for local contractions

This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a fixed-point for local contractions without assuming the family of contraction coefficients to be uniformly bounded away from 1. More importantly it shows how this fixed-point result can apply to study existence and uniqueness of solutions to some recursive equations that arise in economic dynamics.