Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Do Brazilian courts contribute to the implementation of the right to housing?

The objective of this paper is to try to understand the Brazilian’s Courts role in the implementation of the Right to Housing. In order to do that, I analyzed three lawsuits (Favela Olga Benario, Favela Fiat/Vila Esperança and Pinheirinho I) in which the Right to Housing collide with the Right to Private Property. I claim that in spite of the adoption of the Social Function of the Ownership Principle and the formal inclusion of the Right to Housing among social rights protected by the Constitution, Brazilians Courts adopt a very conservative conception of the Right to Private Property and because of that, they tend not to enforce the Right to Housing.