5 resultados para Illinois delegation to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.
Resumo:
This work presents closed-form solutions to Lucasís (2000) generalequilibrium expression for the welfare costs of ináation, as well as to the di§erence between the general-equlibrium measure and Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure. In Lucasís original work only numerical solutions are provided.
Resumo:
The literature on the welfare costs of in‡ation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a single-unity or for a multi-unity transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of in‡ation. Second, we derive su¢cient conditions that make the welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) robust under this alternative setting. Third, we compare our general-equilibrium measure with Bailey’s (1956) partial-equilibrium one.
Resumo:
The literature on the welfare costs of ináation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a one-person or for a many-person transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of ináation. Second, more importantly, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) are robust (invariant) under the number of persons considered in the household. Third, we show that Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of ináation can be obtained as a Örst-order approximation of the general-equilibrium welfare measure derived in this paper using a many-person transacting technology.
Resumo:
This research aimed to find out which are the main factors that lead technology startups to fail. The study focused on companies located in the Southeast region of Brazil that operated between 2009 and 2014. In the beginning, a review of the literature was done to have a better understanding of basic concepts of entrepreneurship as well as modern techniques for developing entrepreneurship. Furthermore, an analysis of the entrepreneurial scenario in Brazil, with a focus on the Southeast, was also done. After this phase, the qualitative study began, in which 24 specialists from startups were interviewed and asked about which factors were crucial in leading a technology startup to fail. After analyzing the results, four main factors were identified and these factors were validated through a quantitative survey. A questionnaire was then formulated based on the answers from the respondents and distributed to founders and executives of startups, which both failed and succeeded. The questionnaire was answered by 56 companies and their answers were treated with the factor analysis statistical method to check the validity of the questionnaire. Finally, the logistical regression method was used to know the extent to which the factors led to the startups’ failure. In the end, the results obtained suggest that the most significant factor that leads technology startups in southeastern Brazil to fail are problems with interpersonal relationship between partners or investors.