O desafio de reconhecimento do sujeito cego em espaços públicos de representação

This work is funded based on the uneasiness with the concept of State as a public machine for development. Of State as a public machine to deliberate valid practices for valid methods and to limit valid subjects in valid spaces. In midst of this specific context, this work dedicates itself to investigate the following research problem: the mistaken recognition of the blind subject in public spaces of representation. For this reason, it was addressed the following question: how the blind subject is recognized in public spaces of representation? To answer the question, it was necessary to contextualize how the blind subject is being recognized in various public spaces of representation. In the international scope, the human rights debate held between the National States was analyzed (BRAND, 2005; KOERNER, 2002; UN, 2006). In the national arena, constitutional rights, federal laws, public policies and institutions representing the blind subject were examined (CABRAL, 2008; SARAVIA, 2006). Finally, in a local context, the fundaments of the concept of citizen for the subject recognition were investigated (AGAMBEN, 2002; RORTY, 1999, DELEUZE AND GUATTARI, 1996). The methodology included reports of national and international representatives in the Lusophone Countries Meeting for Dissemination and Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and, mainly, interviews with blind subjects. The data was processed by content analysis and was discussed based on the following categories: representation spaces; representation modes; representation amplitude; representation premises. The results show, regarding such spaces of representation, the growing importance of thinking the rights of persons with disabilities ¿ group in which belongs the blind subject ¿ as of the international and national scenario. However, the blind subjects announced alternative local spaces for representation: church, internet, radio, etc. Regarding the representation modes, the role of law and standards has been advocated specially in the human rights field. The importance of the cooperation between the States and the civil society to ensure, in practice, the rights achieved was also emphasized. But other forms of representation, directly linked to each interviewee¿ history, was important. Regarding the representation amplitude, there were arguments in defense of a conception of human dignity and freedom to all inhabitants of the globe. The lusophone event highlighted the concern of the cultural peculiarities of those involved in the meeting. The blind interviewees argued for citizenship as construction of instruments for freedom and autonomy, but recognized that this is not a clear desire between the blind people in general, and even less in society as a whole. With respect to the representation premises, the fundaments for the recognition of the blind subject were based on the primacy of reason at the expense of personal experimentation. Experimentation that serves as the foundation of a new form of recognition of the blind subject in public spaces of representation, one more interested in singularities, impenetrable by reason, unmovable to another, and which are irreducible to each subject. The final considerations suggest that if the State has a reason to be, this is not another than to offer instruments to manifest as many as the existential possibilities of the subject. This is the concept of State for development.

Integral representation with convex capacities that are squeeze of (additive) probability measures

In this paper I will investigate the conditions under which a convex capacity (or a non-additive probability which exhibts uncertainty aversion) can be represented as a squeeze of a(n) (additive) probability measure associate to an uncertainty aversion function. Then I will present two alternatives forrnulations of the Choquet integral (and I will extend these forrnulations to the Choquet expected utility) in a parametric approach that will enable me to do comparative static exercises over the uncertainty aversion function in an easy way.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.