Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Voice over IP 2.0: an analysis of limits and potential of IP2IP telecommunication

Internet Telephony (VoIP) is changing the telecommunication industry. Oftentimes free, VoIP is becoming more and more popular amongst users. Large software companies have entered the market and heavily invest into it. In 2011, for instance, Microsoft bought Skype for 8.5bn USD. This trend increasingly impacts the incumbent telecommunication operators. They see their main source of revenue – classic telephony – under siege and disappear. The thesis at hand develops a most-likely scenario in order to determine how VoIP is evolving further and it predicts, based on a ten-year forecast, the impact it will have on the players in the telecommunication industry.The paper presents a model combining Rogers’ diffusion and Christensen’s innovation research. The model has the goal of explaining the past evolution of VoIP and to isolate the factors that determine the further diffusion of the innovation. Interviews with industry experts serve to assess how the identified factors are evolving.Two propositions are offered. First, VoIP operators are becoming more important in international, corporate, and mobile telephony. End-to-end VoIP (IP2IP) will exhibit strong growth rates and increasingly cannibalize the telephony revenues of the classic operators. Second, fix-net telephony in SMEs and at home will continue to be dominated by the incumbents. Yet, as prices for telephony fall towards zero also they will implement IP2IP in order to save costs. By 2022, up to 90% of the calls will be IP2IP. The author recommends the incumbents and VoIP operators to proactively face the change, to rethink their business strategies, and to even be open for cooperation.

O enforcement contratual no Brasil : uma análise das decisões do TJSP e TJRS sobre o contrato de factoring

A teoria da Nova Economia Institucional atribuiu papel de destaque às instituições, classificando-as como as “regras do jogo” nas sociedades. Uma das vertentes desta literatura foca-se em analisar a relação entre o grau de enforcement ou exigibilidade das decisões proferidas pelo Poder Judiciário e seu impacto no desenvolvimento econômico das nações, em especial, dos países em desenvolvimento. No Brasil, este debate ganha relevância no final da década de 1990 a partir de determinadas pesquisas de cunho social realizadas com magistrados, demonstrando que estes tenderiam a sacrificar a previsibilidade judicial em favor da justiça social. Nesse contexto, certos economistas brasileiros lançam a hipótese da existência de um viés anticredor por parte do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, cuja tendência é a de favorecer a parte devedora, fato que resulta na manutenção das altas taxas de juros no país, bem como na inexistência de um mercado de crédito de longo prazo. Diante deste debate, foi selecionado segmento específico – a atividade de factoring – para se desenvolver pesquisa empírica qualitativa substantiva a fim de se (i) investigar o grau de enforcement das decisões contratuais e (ii) testar a existência ou não de um viés anticredor por parte dos Tribunais de Justiça de São Paulo e do Rio Grande do Sul.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.