10 resultados para Human growth
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
We study the impact of the different stages of human capital accumulation on the evolution of labor productivity in a model calibrated to the U.S. from 1961 to 2008. We add early childhood education to a standard continuous time life cycle economy and assume complementarity between educational stages. There are three sectors in the model: the goods sector, the early childhood sector and the formal education sector. Agents are homogenous and choose the intensity of preschool education, how long to stay in formal school, labor effort and consumption, and there are exogenous distortions to these four decisions. The model matches the data very well and closely reproduces the paths of schooling, hours worked, relative prices and GDP. We find that the reduction in distortions to early education in the period was large and made a very strong contribution to human capital accumulation. However, due to general equilibrium effects of labor market taxation, marginal modification in the incentives for early education in 2008 had a smaller impact than those for formal education. This is because the former do not decisively affect the decision to join the labor market, while the latter do. Without labor taxation, incentives for preschool are significantly stronger.
Resumo:
Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital literature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use Örst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrowís (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.
Resumo:
We estimate and test two alternative functional forms, which have been used in the growth literature, representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992), and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumental-variable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model.
Resumo:
A simple exercise on growth and inflationary financing of public expenditures is presented in this note. In a parameterized overlapping generations mode1 where government expenses positivc1y affects the growth rate of human capital, steady state capital and output increase with inflation, reproducing the so called Tobin effect. For large inflation rates, however, government authorities cannot affect real variables and there are only nominal effects. It is also shown that the optimal policy implies some inflation but not growth maximization.
Resumo:
Lucas (2009) propôs um modelo com dois setores para explicar padrões observados em dados de crescimento. Entretanto, a análise de Lucas não envolve uma decisão intertemporal para o consumidor. O comportamento das variáveis é determinado à priori pela tecnologia escolhida. Rodriguez (2006) propôs um modelo com a tecnologia com dois setores apresentada por Lucas adicionando um processo de decisão intertemporal para o consumidor. Adicionalmente aos resultados obtidos por Rodriguez, nós caracterizamos suficiência e apresentamos exemplos esclarecedores de casos particulares do modelo. Ademais, nós fazemos um esforço para derivar novos insights e esclarecer alguns pontos técnicos. Finalmente, nós obtemos condições sob as quais a economia investe em capital humano mesmo com benefícios diferidos.
Resumo:
The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.
Resumo:
We estimate and test two alternative functional forms representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the extended neoclassical growth model, and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumentalvariable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model. Our evidence rejects the extended neoclassical growth model in favor of the mincerian specification, with an estimated capital share of about 42%, a marginal return to education of about 7.5% per year, and an estimated productivity growth of about 1.4% per year. Differences in productivity cannot be disregarded as an explanation of why output per worker varies so much across countries: a variance decomposition exercise shows that productivity alone explains 54% of the variation in output per worker across countries.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the relationship between growth, income inequality, and educational policies. An endogenous growth model is built in which there are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and the quality of the labor force (measured by the fraction of skilled workers) will ultimately determine the economic growth rate. We show that multi pIe inequality and growth paths may arise. Countries will not necessarily converge to the same economic growth and income distribution. When the proportion of skilled workers is low, the economy grows slow, and the Gini coeflicient is high. Low expected growth rate inhibits investments in human capital and the quality of the labor force tomorrow turns out to be low again, keeping the economy in the bad equilibrium. We then analyze the effects on growth and inequality of two types of government intervention: introduction of public schools and vouchers. Both types can induce the economic agents to invest more in education. The consequence will be an increase in the quality of the labor force, leading to higher growth rates and less inequality. Finally, we examine the welfare consequences of these interventions and conclude that they may be Pareto improving.
Resumo:
Capital mobility leads to a speed of convergence smaller in an open economy than in a closed economy. This is related to the presence of two capitals, produced with specific technologies, and where one of the capitals is nontradable, like infrastructures or human capital. Suppose, for example, that the economy is relatively less abundant in human capital, leading to a decrease of the remuneration of this capital during the transition. In a closed economy, the remuneration of physical capital will be increasing during the transition. In the open economy, the alternative investment yields the international interest rate, corresponding to the steady state net remuneration of physical capital in the closed economy. The nonarbitrage condition shows a larger difference in the remuneration of the two capitals in the closed economy. It leads to a higher accumulation of human capital and thus to a faster speed of convergence in the closed economy. This result stands in sharp contrast with that of the one-sector neoclassical growth model, where the speed of convergence is smaller in the closed economy.
Resumo:
The acronym BRICS was a fad among the media and global investors. Now, the acronym sounds passé. However, the group of countries remains important, from both political and economic reasons. They have a large aggregate size, 28% of the global GDP and 42% of the world’s population, high growth potential due to the current significant misallocation of resources and relatively low stock of human capital, structural transformation is in progress and one of them, China, is taking steps to become a global power and a challenger to the US dominance. This paper provides a brief overview of the five economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on some aspects of their history, the Chinese initiatives in international finance and geopolitical strategic moves, their growth experience and structural transformation over the last 35 years, trade and investment integration into the global economy and among themselves, the growth challenges faced by their economies and the potential gains to the Brazilian economy from a stronger integration with the other BRICS. In association with its efforts to be a global power, China aims to become a major player in global finance and to achieve the status of global currency for the renminbi, which would be the first currency of an emerging economy to attain such position. Despite the similarities, the BRICS encompass very diverse economies. In the recent decades, China and India showed stellar growth rates. On the other hand, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have expanded just in line with global output growth with the Russian economy exhibiting high volatility. China is by far the largest economy, and South Africa the smallest, the only BRICS economy with a GDP lower than US$ 1 trillion. Russia abandoned communism almost 25 years ago, but reversed many of the privatizations of 90’s. China is still ruled by communism, but has a vibrant private sector and recently has officially declared market forces to play a dominant role in its economy. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are global natural resources powerhouses and commodity exporters while China and India are large commodity importers. Brazil is relatively closed to international trade of goods and services, in marked contrast to the other four economies. Brazil, India and South Africa are dependent on external capital flows whereas China and Russia are capital exporters. India and South Africa have younger populations and a large portion living below the poverty line. Despite its extraordinary growth experience that lifted many millions from poverty, China still has 28% of its population classified as poor. Russia and China have much older populations and one of their challenges is to deal with the effects of a declining labor force in the near future. India, China and South Africa face a long way to urbanization, while Brazil and Russia are already urbanized countries. China is an industrial economy but its primary sector still absorbs a large pool of workers. India is not, but the primary sector employs also a large share of the labor force. China’s aggregate demand structure is biased towards investment that has been driving its expansion. Brazil and South Africa have an aggregate demand structure similar to the developed economies, with private consumption accounting for approximately 70%. The same similarity applies to the supply side, as in both economies the share of services nears 70%. The development problem is a productivity problem, so microeconomic reforms are badly needed to foster long-term growth of the BRICS economies since they have lost steam due a variety of factors, but fundamentally due to slower total factor productivity growth. China and India are implementing ambitious reform programs, while Brazil is dealing with macroeconomic disequilibria. Russia and South Africa remain mute about structural reforms. There are some potential benefits to Brazil to be extracted from a greater economic integration with the BRICS, particularly in natural resources intensive industries and services. Necessary conditions to the materialization of those gains are the removal of the several sources of resource misallocation and strong investment in human capital.