A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Hope, risk perception and propensity to indebtedness

Hope is an important construct in marketing, once it is an antecedent of important marketing variables, such as trust, expectation and satisfaction (MacInnis & de Mello, 2005, Almeida, Mazzon & Botelho, 2007). Specifically, the literature suggests that hope can play an important influence on risk perception (Almeida, 2010, Almeida et al., 2007, Fleming, 2008, MacInnis & de Mello, 2005) and propensity to indebtedness (Fleming, 2008). Thus, this thesis aims to investigate the relations among hope, risk perception related to purchasing and consumption and propensity to indebtedness, by reviewing the existing literature and conducting two empirical researches. The first of them is a laboratory experiment, which accessed hope and risk perception of getting a mortgage loan. The second is a survey, investigating university students’ propensity to get indebted to pay for their university tuition, analyzed through the method of Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). These studies found that hope seems to play an important role on propensity to indebtedness, as higher levels of hope predicted an increase in the propensity to accept the mortgage loan, independent of actual risks, and an increase in the propensity of college students to get indebted to pay for their studies. In addition, the first study suggests that hope may lead to a decrease in risk perception, which, however, has not been confirmed by the second study. Finally, this research offers some methodological contributions, due to the fact that it is the first study using an experimental method to study hope in Brazil and, worldwide, it is the first study investigating the relation among hope, risk perception and propensity to indebtedness, which proved to be important influences in consumer behavior

Luxury brands and online consumer-generated content: dealing with the new lead of customers in brand perception

User-generated content – conteúdo gerado por usuários – cresceu consideravelmente na Internet nos cinco últimos anos, levando a grandes mudanças nas práticas de marketing. A força do e-word-of mouth, está aumentando e tem uma influência muito forte na percepção da marca pelos consumidores (Allsop, Basset & Hoskins, 2007). Todos os novos instrumentos fornecidos pela Internet permitiram a criação de comunidades de marca online, impactando o compromisso e a lealdade dos consumidores para com a marca (De Valk, Van Bruggen, Wierenga 2009). Todas essas interações criadas entre os consumidores e a marca são relativamente novas e incomuns para as empresas que devem adaptar suas práticas de marketing a essas mudanças. Dadas as especificidades que aplicam as marcas de luxo nas suas políticas de marketing (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009), a questão da adaptação das suas estratégias ao fenômeno de user-generated content é particularmente complicada. As marcas de luxo costumam ter habitualmente uma relação muito reservada com os seus consumidores, baseada em princípios de exclusividade e raridade (Kapferer, 1997). Esta dissertação busca proporcionar algumas pistas de entendimento sobre como as marcas de cosméticos de luxo podem adaptar suas estratégias de marketing em relação à expansão do conteúdo gerado por usuários na Internet. Esta pesquisa qualitativa sugere meios de controlar o conteúdo gerado por usuários, como o incentivar positivamente com certas práticas de marketing e como tirar proveito dele. A seguinte análise mostra que o conteúdo gerado por usuários tem duas facetas: pode atuar como um mídia digital para as empresas de luxo e como uma fonte de informação, inspiração e criação para o desenho dos novos produtos. Sendo um meio de comunicação, as empresas de cosméticos de luxo podem contar com a nova potência do “e-word-of-mouth” a fim de promover sua imagem de marca e seus produtos através do conteúdo gerado por usuários. Sendo uma fonte de inspiração, o conteúdo gerado por usuários pode conduzir a ótimos processos de co-criação e cooperação entre as marcas de cosméticos de luxo e seus consumidores com o objetivo de projetar produtos perfeitamente ajustados ao pedido dos consumidores.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Renegociação de dívidas e moral hazard: uma análise do efeito da política de descontos no pagamento de dívidas de cartões de crédito

O Brasil vem vivenciando um aumento na demanda por cartões de crédito, principalmente nas classes baixas. Entretanto, a população de menor renda e menor qualificação representa maior riscos para a operação. Este fato é evidenciado pelas altas taxas de inadimplência. Exposto isso, empresas se utilizam de estratégias de renegociação de dívida na tentativa de recuperar parte do investimento realizado. Entretanto, poucos foram os estudos acerca da consequência no longo prazo destas estratégias. Utilizando os experimentos realizados por uma empresa de cartão de crédito, cujas campanhas de renegociação variavam mês a mês, este estudo, procurou evidências de que as ofertas de renegociação de dívidas podem afetar a reputação da firma, fazendo com que clientes da rede mesma rede social deste que recebeu a oferta de renegociação também fiquem inadimplentes. Concluímos que o aumento do desconto nas negociações tem um efeito significativo sobre o incentivo do cliente em honrar suas obrigações junto a empresa, ou seja, o aumento de 0,01 p.p. no desconto dado aos clientes aumenta em 0,05 sua probabilidade em atrasar sua fatura no próximo período.

The Brazilian class C women perception regarding premium mass products in the beauty industry

Recentemente, os mercados emergentes se tornaram um alvo potencial para a indústria da beleza e o Brasil está se tornando um mercado lucrativo para os produtos cosméticos Premium (Euromonitor International, 2013). A população de baixa renda no Brasil representa 70% de seus habitantes ao considerar as classes C, D e E (Barki e Parente, 2010), sendo a classe C representada por 56% da população (Neri, 2012). Este é um mercado potencial para as empresas multinacionais (MNCs), que enfrentam desafios de fazer negócios no país, visto que a classe C opta por gastar parte de sua renda com produtos relacionados a beleza (Silva e Parente, 2007) e ainda há um pouco conhecimento sobre o comportamento de consumo na base da pirâmide. Portanto, o objetivo deste estudo é investigar e descrever o comportamento de consumo das mulheres brasileiras da classe C no setor de beleza, em relação aos produtos Mass Premium, melhorando o conhecimento no que diz respeito a essa população e ao tema proposto. Para atingir esse objetivo, o autor utilizou uma metodologia baseada em uma análise descritivas qualitativa em que foram entrevistadas 20 mulheres de todas as faixas etárias, que pertencem à classe C brasileira e citações foram usadas para fornecer a confirmação dos resultados da análise. Os resultados sugerem que, ao longo dos anos, houve de fato um movimento de trade up no consumo de produtos de beleza. Além disso, foram identificados cinco aspectos principais, que conduzem decisão de compra das mulheres de classe C, no setor de beleza: confiabilidade, qualidade, status, autoestima e bem-estar. Apesar das limitações de um estudo exploratório, espera-se que a pesquisa aumente o conhecimento sobre o mercado da base da pirâmide, especialmente no que diz respeito à indústria da beleza.

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.