How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state a§ect the aggregated level of individuals and small businessesí loans. Higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to Öle for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credit. On the other hand, lower levels of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. ConÖrming the theoretical claims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuals and small businesses, where the optimal level of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in U.S. do not apply the optimal level, an intervention that brings the exemption level closer to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Estrutura de mercado e esforço tecnológico

A relação entre estrutura de mercado e inovação tecnológica é um tema amplamente discutido, mas não existe concordância entre os autores que a estudam. Um dos aspectos que tornam o entendimento desta relação importante é seu possível impacto na praxis da política antitruste, já que esta assume que a concorrência perfeita é a estrutura de mercado que maximiza o bem-estar. Esta dissertação investiga o impacto da concentração de mercado (HHI) nos gastos em atividades inovativas para o caso dos setores industriais brasileiros através de uma análise de dados em painel. A partir de informações sobre os gastos em diferentes atividades inovativas e de características da indústria testa-se a hipótese de que a concorrência influencia os gastos em P&D internos às firmas na forma de um U invertido, como prevêem Scherer e Ross (1989) e Aghion et al. (2002). Os principais resultados encontrados indicam que essa relação em U invertido realmente existe e que o índice de concentração que maximiza os gastos em P&D interno é, em torno de, 0,30 de HHI. Apesar disso, quando efeitos específicos da indústria são controlados, o poder de explicação do HHI decai. Um segundo resultado importante é que quando se examina as atividades inovativas com menor risco associado, como capacitação tecnológica, a relação entre concentração e gastos inovativos é negativa.

Implications of ernbodied technological change for development economics

Employing a embodied technologic change model in which the time decision of scrapping old vintages of capital and adopt newer one is endogenous we show that the elasticity of substitutions among capital and labor plays a key role in determining the optimum life span of capital. In particular, for the CD case the life span of capital does not depend on the relative price of it. The estimation of the model's long-run investment function shows, for a Panel data set consisting of 125 economies for 25 years, that the price elasticity of investment is lower than one; we rejected the CD specification. Our calibration for the US suggests 0.4 for the technical elasticity of substitution. In order to get a theoretical consistent concept of aggregate capital we derive the relative price profile for a shadow second-hand market for capital. The shape of the model's theoretical price curve reproduces the empírical estimation of it. \lVe plug the calibrate version of the long-run solution of the model to a cross-section of economies data set to get the implied TFP, that is, the part of the productivity which is not explained by the model. We show that the mo dei represent a good improvement, comparing to the standard neoc!assical growth model with CD production function and disembodied technical change, in accounting the world diversity in productivity. In addition the model describes the fact that a very poor economy can experience fast growth based on capital accumulation until the point of becoming a middle income economy; from this point on it has to rely on TFP increase in order to keep growing.

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state affect the aggregated leveI of individuaIs and small businesses' loans. Higher leveIs of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to file for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credito On the other hand, lower leveIs of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. Confirming the theoretical daims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuaIs and small businesses, where the optimal leveI of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in V.S. do not apply the optimallevel, an intervention that brings the exemption leveI doser to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.