"Não somos diferentes das outras pessoas": a vida cotidiana de mulheres com deficiência mental contada por elas mesmas

O objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar a vida cotidiana de mulheres rotuladas como deficientes mentais, através de seus relatos biográficos pessoais. As entrevistadas descreveram sua rotina em casa e na instituição, falaram sobre suas famílias, relacionamentos, dificuldades em integração social, e sobre seus problemas físicos e de aprendizagem. Ficou clara no discurso deste grupo a dicotomia entre o mundo “de dentro", compreendendo os espaços protegidos da casa e da instituição, e o mundo ameaçador e violento “de fora", representado pela rua. Seus relacionamentos sociais restringem-se aos personagens do mundo “de dentro": a família, os profissionais, e os colegas da instituição, e muitas entrevistadas disseram se· sentir discriminadas pelas pessoas “de fora". Embora várias mulheres tenham exprimido o desejo de ser independentes (trabalhar fora, sair sozinhas, etc), na prática mantém urna relação de extrema dependência familiar. A pesar de dois terços das entrevistadas terem mais de 20 anos, elas não parecem ter nenhuma perspectiva concreta de morar sozinhas, casar, ou vir a formar sua própria família. Um dos pressupostos deste estudo era de que o estigma da deficiência mental, seria o terna central nas histórias de vida. Entretanto, mais da metade dos sujeitos não abordou esta questão, e muito poucas se autodenominaram deficientes. Foi postulado que os efeitos do estigma talvez sejam minimizados neste grupo devido à superproteção familiar e institucional por um lado, e a evitação do mundo "de fora" (onde esta condição seria denunciada mais abertamente) por outro. Assim sendo, em sua prática diária, a maioria dessas mulheres têm poucas oportunidades de se confrontar com a situação de marginalização. Deficiência mental foi analisada como um fenômeno socialmente construído, e acredita-se que estas pessoas funcionem em um nível mais dependente do que sua condição orgânica exigiria, por terem sido reforçadas por representar o papel social de deficientes. Apesar das características comuns, cada história de vida provou ser original e única, mostrando o erro em se considerar as pessoas portadoras de deficiência mental como um grupo homogêneo e bem definido. Além disso, a não ser pela dependência familiar, falta de participação autônoma e integrada na comunidade, e relacionamento amoroso e sexual restrito, a ideia dessas mulheres não é qualitativamente diferente do resto da população.

Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families

Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of peoples´s lives, such as the provisions related to, inter alia, unemployment, diseases, accidents, robbery and death. Microinsurance improves the ability of low-income individuals to cope with these risks. Brazil has a fairly developed financial system but still not geared towards the poor, especially in what concerns the insurance industry. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The Brazilian government provides a relatively developed social security system considering other countries of similar income level which crowds-out the demand for insurance and savings. On the other hand, this same public infrastructure may help to foster microfinance products supply. The objective of this paper is to analyze the demand for different types of private insurance by the low-income population using microdata from a National Expenditure Survey (POF/IBGE). The final objective is to help to understand the trade-offs faced for the development of an emerging industry of microinsurance in Brazil.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.