From the national-bourgeois to the associated dependency interpretation of latin America

Nos anos 1960 e 1970 a América Latina foi palco de golpes militares modernizadores e da transição de seus intelectuais do nacionalismo para a dependência associada. Nos anos 1950 dois grupos de intelectuais públicos, organizados entre a Cepal, em Santiago, Chile, e o ISEB, no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, abriram caminho para o pensamento das sociedades e economias latino-americanas (inclusive do Brasil) a partir de uma visão nacionalista. A Cepal criticava principalmente a lei das vantagens comparativas e suas essenciais implicações imperialistas; o ISEB se focava na definição política de uma estratégia nacional-desenvolvimentista. A idéia de uma burguesia nacional era a resposta para esta interpretação da América Latina. A Revolução Cubana, a crise econômica dos anos 1960 e os golpes militares nos países do Cone Sul, entretanto, criaram espaço para a crítica a essas idéias com uma nova interpretação: a da dependência. Ao rejeitar totalmente a possibilidade de uma burguesia nacional, duas versões da interpretação da dependência (a interpretação “associada” e a “superexploração”) também rejeitaram a possibilidade de uma estratégia nacional-desenvolvimentista. Apenas uma terceira interpretação, a “nacional-dependente” continuava a afirmar a necessidade e a possibilidade de uma burguesia nacional e de uma estratégia nacional. Entretanto, foi a interpretação da dependência associada que foi dominante na América Latina nos anos 1970 e 1980.

Structural transformation and productivity in Latin America

This article examines the e¤ects of sectorial shifts and structural transformation on the recent productivity path of Latin America. We use a four-sector (agriculture, industry, modern services and traditional services) general equilibrium model calibrated to the main economies in the region. The model very closely replicates labor reallocations across sectors and the growth of aggregate labor productivity from 1950 to 2005. Structural transformation explains a sizeable portion of the region s convergence in the rst decades. In most cases, the poor performance of the traditional services sector is the main cause of the slowdown in productivity growth observed in the region after the mid-1970s and is a key factor in explaining the divergence during this period.

Consumption smoothing in Latin America: an empirical assessment of present value models

The study aims to assess the empirical adherence of the permanent income theory and the consumption smoothing view in Latin America. Two present value models are considered, one describing household behavior and the other open economy macroeconomics. Following the methodology developed in Campbell and Schiller (1987), Bivariate Vector Autoregressions are estimated for the saving ratio and the real growth rate of income concerning the household behavior model and for the current account and the change in national cash ‡ow regarding the open economy model. The countries in the sample are considered separately in the estimation process (individual system estimation) as well as jointly (joint system estimation). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE) estimates of the coe¢cients are generated. Wald Tests are then conducted to verify if the VAR coe¢cient estimates are in conformity with those predicted by the theory. While the empirical results are sensitive to the estimation method and discount factors used, there is only weak evidence in favor of the permanent income theory and consumption smoothing view in the group of countries analyzed.

Past and future of the bankruptcy law in Brazil and Latin America

This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.

The evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to widespread government intervention and import-substitution industrialization, there has been a general perception that Latin America has always been less productive than the leading economies. In this paper, however, we show that until the mid-seventies Latin America had high productivity levels relative to the US and other regions. Moreover, total factor productivity in Latin America increased relative to the US during this period, declining only in the subsequent years.

Evaluation of contagion or interdependence in the financial crises of Asia and Latin America, considering the macroeconomic fundamentals

This article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994-2003. The economic methodology used is that of multivariate GARCH family volatility models, particularly the DCC models in the form proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001). The returns were duly corrected for a series of country-specific fundamentals. The relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of Pesaran and Pick (2003). The results obtained in this paper provide evidence favourable to the hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and Asia. As a rule, contagion spread from the Asian crisis to Latin America but not in the opposite direction

The evolution of TFP in Latin America: high productivity when distortions were high?

Due to widespread government intervention and import-substitution industrialization, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper, however, we show that until the late seventies Latin America had high total factor productivity (TFP) levels relative to the US and other regions. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. Results are robust to the use of diferent methodologies and data sources.

The Profile of a Manager in Higher Education Institution in Latin America: The Case of the EBAPE

The aim of this study is to analyze the profile of today’s manager, according to the classical management literature, working on internationalized higher education institute. This paper draws together knowledge about the manager’s profile in a corporate environment and how it can be appreciated in a higher education institute all of this taking into consideration the environment that nowadays exists in these institutions. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, with professors of the Fundacao Getulio Vargas, more specific on their Public and Business Administration School (EBAPE), which had active roles on its development, internationalization and during some point in time their management. The findings obtained where analyzed under the perspective brought by the theoretical reference framework, and, based on this approach is represented the manager whom could have a better perspective to administrate a higher education institute.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial diference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

Need and opportunity: what are the main security threats to the pharmaceuticals industry in Latin America?

Os preços altos de produtos farmacêuticos patenteados sempre têm sido uma polêmica na América Latina. Considerando as disparidades económicas na região e a falta histórica do desenvolvimento, muitas vezes os preços altos servem como barreiras contra o acesso aos medicamentos essenciais. Por um lado, as companhias farmacêuticas dizem que os preços elevados são necessários para financiar os processos de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e para gerar um retorno do investimento lucrativo. Por outro lado, os consumidores, tanto privados como públicos, dizem que os preços altos têm resultado em uma falta histórica de medicamentos baratos. Neste debate, ambos lados têm realizado uma série de manobras e contramanobras que têm exposto algumas das vulnerabilidades do setor. Utilizando vários métodos de análise e entrevistas com profissionais no setor, este projeto analisa as vulnerabilidades do setor para determinar o risco, ao mesmo tempo tentando a responder à pergunta: Quais são as ameaças principais na segurança da indústria farmacêutica na América Latina? Justificação deste projeto é o aumento dos crimes relacionados aos produtos farmacêuticos na última década, que têm exposto os pacientes a um número de riscos mais alto. Uma compreensão das ameaças principais é necessária para melhor mitigar o risco, garantir a integridade de produtos e preservar a saúde pública.

The experience of semi-formal infrastructure finance in developing countries: proposals for Brazil and Latin America

This paper has the purpose of analyzing the role of civil society in funding and providing nfrastructure projects in developing countries. Considering that local associations around the world have been directly engaged on some infrastructure projects – some scholars define it as “semi-formal finance” –, the intention is to demonstrate that the experiences on such arrangements in developing countries have been responsible for fostering infrastructure investments in the poorer regions where the government is more absent. Based upon legal, economic and social aspects, this paper aims to contribute to a broader debate for the development of infrastructure in emerging countries. The conclusion is that, under a more social approach, the legal and economic mechanisms in developing countries are able to consider such arrangements in the benefit of their development.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial difference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.