The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Endogenous protection in Mercosul: an empirical analysis

This paper analyses the equilibrium structure of protection in Mercosul, developing empirical analyses based on the literature ensuing from the sequence of models set forth by Grossman and Helpman since 1994. Not only Mercosul’s common external tariff (CET) may be explained under a political economy perspective, but the existence of deviations, both at the level of the external tariffs and at that of the internal ones, make it interesting to contrast several structures under this approach. Different general equilibrium frameworks, in which governments are concerned with campaign contributions and with the welfare of the average voter, while organized special-interest groups care only about the welfare of their members, are used as the theoretical basis of the empirical tests. We build a single equation for explaining the CET and two fourequations systems (one equation for each member) for explaining deviations from the CET and from the internal free trade between members. The results (at the two-digit level) shed an interesting light on the sectoral dynamics of protection in each country; notably, Brazil seems to fit in better in the model framework, followed by Uruguay. In the case of the CET, and of deviations from it, the interaction between the domestic lobbies in the four countries plays a major role. There is also suggestion that the lobby structure that bid for deviations, be they internal or external, differs from the one which bid for the CET.

Motivação: um enfoque neurofisiológico

Não esquecendo toda uma conotação SOCial que está implicante ligada à motivação, o presente trabalho visa estudar em bases neurofisiológicas. Sabemos que a motivação ainda não possui seu constructo solidificado. Possui uma variabilidade de entretenimento da escola psicológica para escolas psicológicas, de pesquisador para pesquisador, de cultura para cultura, de tempo para tempo.... Este trabalho não tem um fim reducionista em apenas ver a motivação com bases neurofisiológicas. Seu objetivo é clarificar, se possível, um campo discutível. Podemos ver apesar dos vários modos de encarar a motivação como processo social, seu modo de se dar, fisiologicamente, poderá ser mais delimitado. Qualquer que seja a conceituação dada a motivação, ela possui um mecanismo fisiológico interno, inegável. Será neste campo que dedicar-me-ei. O que se dá no sistema nervoso quando um ser vivo é motivado? Será que o mecanismo fisiológico da motivação difere de ser para ser? Ou será diferente apenas de espécie para espécie? Iniciaremos nosso trabalho vendo as diferentes visões de motivação e como os cientistas a encaram. Verificamos que a preocupação dada desde muito em estabelecer um ponto de partida mais operacional para p desenvolvimento da fisiologia em cases científicas. Para isto, muito contribuíram FUNVESTEIN, CANNON, SHERRINGTON, MAGNUN e MORUZZI, SECHENOV, LASHLEY e outros. Entretanto, inicialmente esta preocupação era maior pelas manifestações viscerais e somáticas do comportamento. Só com o desenvolvimento das pesquisas sobre Hipotálamo e o Sistema Límbico foi que se conseguiu, realmente, em campo melhor para as pesquisas sobre motivação. Não podemos esquecer as contribuições de SKINNER e PAVLON sobre recompensa, as de BANDURA com a variável – Modelação do Comportamento, de BUTTLER e NISSEN com a descrição do comportamento da curiosidade exploratória, as de HEBB sobre os efeitos da estimulação sensorial restrita, as de JAMES OLDS sobre a estimulação elétrica. Estudaremos as interpretações teóricas recentes com CANON, LASHLEY, BEACH, MORGAN, LORENS, DEUTSCH, LINDSLEY, GROSSMAN. Teceremos considerações anatômicas, histológicas, fisiológicas, conexões e funções no estudo do Sistema Límbico e seus componentes. Nossa maior preocupação serpa em tentar explicar os mecanismos motivacionais na sua relação com o Sistema Nervoso. Estudaremos motivações sexual, de forma, de sede, de dor, maternal e paternal, de defesa, de ataque ou dominação e como elas estão relacionadas no sistema nervoso. Para tal apresentamos experiências realizadas sobre estimulação sensorial, motivação e emoção, e as experiências de OLDS sobre fatores motivacionais obtidos através de estimulações ou ablações de determinadas áreas do Sistema Límbico. Espero que, através desta dissertação, tenha podido contribuir um pouco para o estudo de tão vasto campo.

Bubble detection in Brazil’s stock market: application of the generalized superior augmented Dickey-Fuller test

Considering the importance of the proper detection of bubbles in financial markets for policymakers and market agents, we used two techniques described in Diba and Grossman (1988b) and in Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015) to detect periods of exuberance in the recent history of the Brazillian stock market. First, a simple cointegration test is applied. Secondly, we conducted several augmented, right-tailed Dickey-Fuller tests on rolling windows of data to determine the point in which there’s a structural break and the series loses its stationarity.