Two Essays on the economics of Education

We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more effective signal.

The costs of education, longevity and the poverty of nations

This paper explores the distortions on the cost of education, associated with government policies and institutional factors, as an additional determinant of cross-country income differences. Agents are finitely lived and the model takes into account life-cycle features of human capital accumulation. There are two sectors, one producing goods and the other providing educational services. The model is calibrated and simulated for 89 economies. We find that human capital taxation has a relevant impact on incomes, which is amplified by its indirect effect on returns to physical capital. Life expectancy plays an important role in determining long-run output: the expansion of the population working life increases the present value of the flow of wages, which induces further human capital investment and raises incomes. Although in our simulations the largest gains are observed when productivity is equated across countries, changes in longevity and in the incentives to educational investment are too relevant to ignore.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

The impact of structured teaching methods on the quality of education

This paper estimates the impact of the use of structured methods on the quality of education of the students in primary public school in Brazil. Structure methods encompass a range of pedagogical and managerial instruments applied to the education system. In recent years, several municipalities in the State of São Paulo have contracted out private educational providers to implement these structured methods in their schooling system. Their pedagogical proposal involves structuring curriculum contents, elaboration and use of teachers and students textbooks, and training and supervision of the teachers and instructors. Using a difference in differences estimation strategy, we find that the fourth and eighth grader students in the municipalities with structured methods performed better in Portuguese and Math than students in municipalities not exposed to the methods. We find no differences in approval rates. However, a robustness check is not able to discard the possibility that unobserved municipal characteristics may affect the results.

The relationship between board of director's nationality diversity and financial performance

Companies are moving to a more international structure; going into new markets and having an increased competition in all fronts. Therefore, the practices that lead companies to a more efficient and competitive position are praised. The management of the workforce comes as one of the main concerns of companies, aiming at performance enhancing and at creating better environments that both attract and maintain the professional talents. In an increasingly international environment, companies tend to look for the specialists and best professionals, regardless of their nationality. This new structure with several different nationalities working together poses new challenges for companies. Understanding if and how a more diverse has a relationship with financial performance is the starting point for better managing this new corporate structure.

Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education

This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.