4 resultados para Global Observation Research Initiative in Alpine Environments
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
In this thesis I investigate the extent to which companies can build a more communal environment out of their fan pages while also evaluating the corresponding brand value that may come from having such a communal environment. My research is comprised in three articles: in the first article, I describe how the brand image is created or augmented in the fan page environment, therefore providing demonstrable evidence of value creation. In the second article, I describe how individuals use fan page semiotic elements to communicate their identities. Finally, in the third article, I describe the possible communal characteristics of a fan page and the conditions that enable it to evolve to the virtual brand community concept. As a result, I will contribute to the marketing literature on the use of Facebook for communicating brand identity, on the co-creation of the brand image in social media context, and on the conceptual definition of fan pages as a communal environment.
Resumo:
O fenômeno das empresas born globals e a internacionalização de empresas brasileiras de base tecnológica são tópicos recentes na literatura acadêmica, devido também ao fenômeno ser recente. Não existem muitos estudados feitos com foco no mercado brasileiro, e os poucos que foram feitos, possuem um viés quantitativo. Esse estudo, entretanto, tem como objetivo analisar startups de maneira qualitativa. Uma extensa revisão de literatura foi desenvolvida a fim de melhor analisar as fundações nas quais o estudo seria desenvolvido, revisando os métodos de internacionalização, empreendedorismo no Brasil, e o fenômeno born global no geral. Entrevistas foram conduzidas com empreendedores no Brasil, que passaram pelo processo de internacionalização de seus modelos de negócios, a fim de reunir introspecções a respeito das peculiaridades do mercado brasileiro. Foram também analisados os fatores de escalabilidade de modelos de negócios dependentes de tecnologia, motivadores para a internacionalização, critério de seleção de mercados, programas governamentais, e o papel das startups brasileiras em uma perspectiva global.
Resumo:
The present volume is the fruit of a research initiative on Access to Knowledge begun in 2004 by Yochai Benkler, Eddan Katz, and myself. Access to Knowledge is both a social movement and an approach to international and domestic policy. In the present era of globalization, intellectual property and information and communications technology are major determinants of wealth and power. The principle of access to knowledge argues that we best serve both human rights and economic development through policies that make knowledge, knowledge-creating tools, and nowledgeembedded goods as widely available as possible for decentralized innovation and use. Open technological standards, a balanced approach to intellectual property rights, and expansion of an open telecommunications infrastructure enable ordinary people around the world to benefit from the technological advances of the information age and allow them to generate a vibrant, participatory and democratic culture. Law plays a crucial role in securing access to knowledge, determining whether knowledge and knowledge goods are shared widely for the benefit of all, or controlled and monopolized for the benefit of a few.
Resumo:
My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.