Equity and Efficiency in Education: motivations and targets

The recently released "Educational PAC" attempts to place basic education at the center of the social debate. We have subsidized this debate, offering a diagnosis of how different education levels can impact individuals' lives through broad and easily interpreted indicators. Initially, we analyze how much each educational level reaches the poorest population. For example, how are those in the bottom strata of income distribution benefited by childcare centers, private secondary education, public university or adult education. The next step is to quantify the return of educational actions, such as their effects on employability and an individual's wages, and even health as perceived by the individual, be that individual poor, middle class or elite. The next part of the research presents evidence of how the main characters in education, aka mothers, fathers and children, regard education. The site available with the research presents a broad, user-friendly database, which will allow interested parties to answer their own questions relative to why people do not attend school, the time spent in the educational system and returns to education, which can all be cross-sectioned with a wide array of socio-demographic attributes (gender, income, etc.) and school characteristics (is it public, are school meals offered, etc.) to find answers to: why do young adults of a certain age not attend school? Why do they miss classes? How long is the school day? Aside from the whys and hows of teaching, the research calculates the amount of time spent in school, resulting from a combination between absence rates, evasion raters and length of the school day. The study presents ranks of indicators referring to objective and subjective aspects of education, such as the discussion of the advantages and care in establishing performance based incentives that aim at guiding the states in the race for better educational indicators.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous discount factors: (revised version, forthcoming 2006, Revista Economia)

This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a jobsearch process when di§erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have di§erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing function of the discount factor (Cysne (2004, 2006)), I show that the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage o§ers and the distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some insights into how much income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not Önd a job o§er each period.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous time preferences

This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income inequality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time preferences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also offers an alternative explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation between time preference and labor income. Under some speciÖc distributions regarding wage offers and time preferences, we show how the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income distribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the parameters of the model.

Gender stereotypes in politics: what changes when a woman becomes the local political leader?

This study documents how the presence of a woman in an executive political role affects the gender stereotype of women in politics. We use Brazilian electoral data and restrict our focus to close mayoral races (using an RDD design) in which the top two candidates are of opposite sexes. Our most important result was a reduction in the number of candidates and votes for female mayoral candidates after a woman is elected, regardless of her eligibility status for reelection. This negative result is linked only to the position of mayor and not to other political positions (councilor, state or federal deputy). In addition, our results may be interpreted as evidence that voters do not use their update on women as local leaders to change their beliefs on women’s ability to run for other political positions. Finally, female mayors do not appear to have a role model effect on younger cohorts of women. We also note that our results are not influenced by differences in mayoral policies (generally and specifically for women), which could influence voters’ gender stereotypes.

Is 'tagging' a rationale for affirmative action in education?

In this paper, we try to rationalize the existence of one of the most common affirmative action policies: educational quotas. We model a two period economy with asymmetric information and endogenous human capital formation. Individuals may be from two different groups in the population, where each group is defined by an observable and exogenous characteristic. The distribution of skills differ across groups. We introduce educational quotas into the model by letting the planner reduce the effort cost that a student from one of the groups has to endure in order to be accepted into a university. Affirmative action policies can be interpreted as a form of ``tagging" since group characteristics are used as proxies for productivity. We find that although educational quotas are usually efficient, they need not subsidize the education of the low skill group.

Earnings dynamics and inequality in Venezuela: 1995-1997

In this paper, we decompose the variance of logarithmic monthly earnings of prime age males into its permanent and transitory components, using a five-wave rotating panel from the Venezuelan “Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo” from 1995 to 1997. As far as we know, this is the first time a variance components model is estimated for a developing country. We test several specifications and find that an error component model with individual random effects and first order serially correlated errors fits the data well. In the simplest model, around 22% of earnings variance is explained by the variance of permanent component, 77% by purely stochastic variation and the remaining 1% by serial correlation. These results contrast with studies from industrial countries where the permanent component is predominant. The permanent component is usually interpreted as the results of productivity characteristics of individuals whereas the transitory component is due to stochastic perturbations such as job and/or price instability, among others. Our findings may be due to the timing of the panel when occurred precisely during macroeconomic turmoil resulting from a severe financial crisis. The findings suggest that earnings instability is an important source of inequality in a region characterized by high inequality and macroeconomic instability.