Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

A crise e as novas fronteiras para a indústria fonográfica

The world's record industry has been undergoing a deep crisis over the past years, and has been seeking ways to overcome the fall in legal CD and DVD sales. Paradoxally, consumption of music in its varied forms has been increasing over the same period. Within this adverse scenario, record companies have been trying to adjust their business models so as to encompass other products and services bearing a direct relationship with music. This paper aims at identifying the causes as well as assessing opportunities and initiatives within the market aiming at allowing the record industry to overcome the ongoing crisis. The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of the current situation and propose alternatives to overcome the crisis, including digital music and the market of concerts and events as potential opportunities for the industry.

Non-emptiness of the alpha-core

We prove non-emptiness of the alpha-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991) and Kajii (1992). In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied while our non-emptiness result applies.

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Factors influencing consumer decision in crowdfunding

Crowdfunding é um método recente e emergente de captar dinheiro para desenvolvimento de projetos (tanto orientados a lucro ou não) sem a intermediação tradicional de instituições financeiras, liberando empreendedores de custos, regulações e burocracia associada a essa prática. Além disso, também é um método de pré-testar novos produtos com um público selecionado e entusiasmado. O objetivo dessa dissertação é entender que fatores estão influenciando a decisão do consumidor de investir em projetos. A literatura contribui com: (1) fatores intrínsecos, como desejo de patronagem; (2) fatores extrínsecos, como a apresentação do projeto; e (3) pressão social. Há ainda fatores associados com o nível atual de captação e número de investidores, assim como tipo de projeto envolvido, sendo ele de caridade ou não. Além disso, atitudes também possuem um papel em afetar a decisão de compra. Para responder a pergunta de pesquisa, uma metodologia de duas fases foi usada: uma entrevista de profundidade para capturar intenção de investir e motivação, de forma a construir um processo de decisão que englobasse todas as possibilidades descritas pela literatura. Após essa pesquisa qualitativa, uma pesquisa quantitativa foi feita para validar as informações coletadas pela fase anterior e coletar dados adicionais para gerar uma associação entre intenção de investir e comportamento. Dentre as informações geradas pela fase qualitativa, temos o fato que a maioria dos investidores tiveram como principal motivação a compra do produto sendo oferecido como se eles estivessem participando de uma pré-venda. Entretanto, essa não foi a principal razão para o investidor de caridade. Além disso, os respondentes que pré-compraram os produtos o fizeram para única razão que esses produtos satisfizeram desejos que tinham. Esses desejos variavam, sendo desde saudade de jogos antigos como resolver um problema de organização da carteira. Outra característica da pré-compra foi que eles não investiam valores simbólicos, pela razão que se o fizessem não receberiam o produto em troca. Recompensas tiveram um grande papel em atrair os respondentes para investimento em valores maiores que consideravam anteriormente. Também é verdade para o investidor em caridade, que também doou mais. A fase quantitativa confirmou as informações acima e gerou informação extra sobre as categorias de produto. Projetos de caridade e arte concentraram a maioria dos respondentes que disseram que a principal razão para investir foi basicamente ajudar a desenvolver o projeto sem demandar um produto em retorno. Entretanto, outros projetos como Música também apresentaram altos números de comportamento caridoso, possivelmente por causa do envolvimento emocional com o artista. Outras categorias apresentaram um mix de razões para investir ou enviesado a comprar o produto apenas, o que pode ser explicado pelo efeito de recompensas e pelo fato que essas categorias estão simplesmente pré-vendendo produtos. Essa pesquisa também confirmou as principais fontes usadas para conhecer mais sobre os projetos: recomendação pessoal e blogs e fóruns. Outro resultado dessa fase foi o desenvolvimento de fatores a partir de frases atitudinais que puderam explicar intenção de investir. Seis fatores foram criados: Entusiasmo (por crowdfunding), Exclusividade (compra de recompensas), Caridade (doações pequenas para ajudar o desenvolvimento do projeto), Cautela (similar à difusão de responsabilidade, isto é, espera por mais investidores para dar o primeiro passo), Intimidade (projeto foi recomendado ou há ligação emocional com o criador) e Compartilhamento (compartilhar para ajudar a trazer mais investidores para o projeto). Categorias com alto envolvimento emocional apresentaram associação com Intimidade, como música, filme e tecnologia. Dado o fato que a amostra não continha muitos entusiastas por crowdfunding, esse fator não apresentou qualquer associação com as categorias. Categorias que não entregam produtos em troca, como comida e fotografia, apresentaram altos níveis de associação com o fator caridade. Compartilhamento é altamente associado com tecnologia, dado o fato que essa categoria concentra os respondentes que são mais orientados à inovação e entusiastas sobre o produto, então precisam compartilhar e gerar boca-a-boca para ajudar a atingir a meta de investimento.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.