Can a habit formation model really explain the Forward Premium Anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) mostra que desejando-se explicar o comporta- mento do prêmio de risco nos mercados de títulos estrangeiros usando- se o modelo de formação externa de hábitos proposto por Campbell e Cochrane (1999) será necessário especi car o retorno livre de risco de equilíbrio de maneira pró-cíclica. Mostramos que esta especi cação só é possível sobre parâmetros de calibração implausíveis. Ainda no processo de calibração, para a maioria dos parâmetros razoáveis, a razão preço-consumo diverge. Entretanto, adotando a sugestão pro- posta por Verdelhan (2009) - de xar a função sensibilidade (st) no seu valor de steady-state durante a calibração e liberá-la apenas du- rante a simulação dos dados para se garantir taxas livre de risco pró- cíclicas - conseguimos encontrar um valor nito e bem comportado para a razão preço-consumo de equilíbrio e replicar o foward premium anom- aly. Desconsiderando possíveis inconsistências deste procedimento, so- bre retornos livres de risco pró-cíclicos, conforme sugerido por Wachter (2006), o modelo utilizado gera curvas de yields reais decrescentes na maturidade, independentemente do estado da economia - resultado que se opõe à literatura subjacente e aos dados reais sobre yields.

Can a habit formation model really explain the forward premium anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) shows that if one is to explain the foreign exchange forward premium behavior using Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s habit formation model one must specify it in such a way to generate pro-cyclical short term risk free rates. At the calibration procedure, we show that this is only possible in Campbell and Cochrane’s framework under implausible parameters specifications given that the price-consumption ratio diverges in almost all parameters sets. We, then, adopt Verdelhan’s shortcut of fixing the sensivity function λ(st) at its steady state level to attain a finite value for the price-consumption ratio and release it in the simulation stage to ensure pro-cyclical risk free rates. Beyond the potential inconsistencies that such procedure may generate, as suggested by Wachter (2006), with procyclical risk free rates the model generates a downward sloped real yield curve, which is at odds with the data.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.