Análise dos fatores de convencimento do juízo brasileiro quanto à ocorrência de fraude contábil: um estudo de caso Múltiplo da Gallus, da Encol e do Banco Santos

This work is based on the analysis of three Brazilian cases of condemnation by accounting fraud and financial reports manipulation of data, where we tried to identify if there is condemnation by accounting fraud in Brazil and the main factors considered by the judge to convince them about the accounting fraud. The theoretical reference quoted involves the theory of fraud, the psychology of fraud, examples of financial fraud in foreign companies and Brazilians banks and the law in Brazil regarding fraud and money laundering. The methodology consisted in studies of Brazilian cases with the data collection criteria from three law suits. The methodology used was the Contents Analysis The samples were chosen according to the impact those cases had in Brazil and the facility to access their law suits. Therefore, we chose Gallus Agropecuária S/A, Encol S/A and Banco Santos S/A for a matter of convenience. The evidence indicated that in those three cases, the court was convinced by the accounting fraud due to omission of relevant financial information in the balance sheet, by information provided to the market that didn¿t reflect the healthy of the company (assets written up without the property). It was identified as well that, in those three cases, there was condemnation not only for the accounting fraud per si, but also by the combination of other crimes as money laundering, fraud gang, material and ideological false fraud, and bankruptcy.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

A utilização de planos de previdência complementar como instrumento de fraude a normas de proteção à herança legítima

Com a entrada em vigor da Lei do Bem, em 2006, houve expressivo crescimento na comercialização de planos denominados PGBL (“Plano Gerador de Benefícios Livres”) e VGBL (“Vida Gerador de Benefícios Livres”) a pessoas físicas por bancos e sociedades seguradoras, como instrumentos de planejamento sucessório, uma vez que uma das principais vantagens advindas da utilização destes planos é a previsão de pagamento do capital aportado pelo titular sob a forma de pecúlio diretamente aos beneficiários indicados em caso de seu falecimento. Diante da regulamentação subsidiária da legislação securitária nas hipóteses de falecimento do titular, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo a análise da natureza jurídica destes planos, bem como de possíveis consequências indesejáveis do ponto de vista sucessório, notadamente, o direito dos herdeiros necessários à parcela da herança que compõe a legítima.

O uso de tecnologia biométrica para o combate à fraude e a melhoria da gestão de pessoas no serviço público

Este trabalho teve como objetivo analisar o uso da biometria no serviço público como forma de redução das oportunidades de fraudes e melhoria da gestão de pessoas na administração pública. Para isso, foi feita uma comparação semiestruturada da experiência internacional e um estudo de caso aprofundado do projeto Identidade Funcional, desenvolvido pelo governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. As lições mais importantes, derivadas destas experiências, estão refletidas em um modelo de projeto para formação de uma base biométrica capaz de garantir a integridade do cadastro de pagamento dos salários e benefícios de previdência da administração pública. O modelo tomou por referência a prefeitura de Duque de Caxias, porém foi estruturado de modo a ser viável em municípios do mesmo porte.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Avenues to success : electoral strategies and ambition in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

In the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber ofDeputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and again 75% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% ofthem in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target of Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-Iegislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not alIlegislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume alI of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vicegovernor). A minority still, may run for state leveI offices (regressive ambition).Given that static and progressive ambition are the two main types of career choice in Brazil, we focus on the factors that influence the career decision and electoral success of those who choose to run for reelection and those who choose to run for higher-level offices, i.e. senator and governor. We use data recently colIected from the 2002 elections.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Exposing corrupt politicians : the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountabil- ity. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the e®ects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio sta- tions. These ¯ndings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

Polarización y resaca electoral en Brasil

Concluidas las exasperadas elecciones de 2014, el país pasa por un momento delicado. Por un lado, es esperado que la nueva composición del gobierno busque un tono de reconciliación posicionándose de una manera más moderada que permita el funcionamiento del modelo de gobierno de coalición aun en práctica. Por otro, ya queda evidente que será un arduo y doloroso proceso en virtud a la intensa polarización política que, a pesar de apuntar tendencias de distensión sigue un expresivo elemento en la conducción de la política brasileña