KittyCat: a cognitive model of structure-form discovery

Cognition is a core subject to understand how humans think and behave. In that sense, it is clear that Cognition is a great ally to Management, as the later deals with people and is very interested in how they behave, think, and make decisions. However, even though Cognition shows great promise as a field, there are still many topics to be explored and learned in this fairly new area. Kemp & Tenembaum (2008) tried to a model graph-structure problem in which, given a dataset, the best underlying structure and form would emerge from said dataset by using bayesian probabilistic inferences. This work is very interesting because it addresses a key cognition problem: learning. According to the authors, analogous insights and discoveries, understanding the relationships of elements and how they are organized, play a very important part in cognitive development. That is, this are very basic phenomena that allow learning. Human beings minds do not function as computer that uses bayesian probabilistic inferences. People seem to think differently. Thus, we present a cognitively inspired method, KittyCat, based on FARG computer models (like Copycat and Numbo), to solve the proposed problem of discovery the underlying structural-form of a dataset.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.