A implementação da estratégia nacional de defesa, 2008-2013

O debate sobre defesa no Brasil ainda fica aquém de sua importância estratégica para o país. Entretanto, nos anos recentes, a questão passou a ganhar maior relevância e assuntos relacionados ao tema começam a ganhar mais destaque, inclusive na mídia (compra dos caças Gripen, por exemplo). A institucionalização da Defesa no Brasil teve importantes marcos desde a criação do Ministério da Defesa (MD) em 1999, passando pela elaboração da Política Nacional de Defesa (PND) em 2005, da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) em 2008 e, finalmente, do Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional (LBDN) em 2012. As relações civis militares são pautadas por visões muitas vezes distintas sobre a Defesa, é preciso que haja uma maior convergência nesse entendimento. Entretanto, ainda há um longo caminho a ser percorrido para que a sociedade compreenda e tenha um maior envolvimento com tema tão relevante de interesse nacional. O presente estudo objetiva analisar o grau de implementação das diretrizes da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) e avaliar os motivos que impactaram nas ações propostas para sua efetivação.

Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.