The trasition from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes: the case of Brazil

This dissertation evaluates macroeconomic management in Brazil from 1994 to the present, with particular focus on exchange rate policy. It points out that while Brazil's Real Plan succeeded in halting the hyperinflation that had reached more than 2000 percent in 1993, it also caused significant real appreciation of the exchange rate situation that was only made worse by the extremely high interest rates and ensuing bout of severe financial crises in the intemational arena. By the end of 1998, the accumulation of internai and externai imbalances led the authorities to drop foreign exchange controls and allow the currency to float. In spite of some initial scepticism, the flexible rate regime cum inflation target proved to work well. Inflation was kept under control; the current account position improved significantly, real interest rates fell and GDP growth resumed. Thus, while great challenges still lie ahead, the recent successes bestow some optimism on the well functioning of this exchange rate regime. The Brazilian case suggests that successful transition from one foreign exchange system to another, particularly during financial crisis, does not depend only on one variable be it fiscal or monetary. In reality, it depends on whole set of co-ordinated policies aimed at resuming price stability with as little exchange rate and output volatility as possible.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.