3 resultados para First-principles calculation
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper investigates the degree of short run and long run co-movement in U.S. sectoral output data by estimating sectoraI trends and cycles. A theoretical model based on Long and Plosser (1983) is used to derive a reduced form for sectoral output from first principles. Cointegration and common features (cycles) tests are performed; sectoral output data seem to share a relatively high number of common trends and a relatively low number of common cycles. A special trend-cycle decomposition of the data set is performed and the results indicate a very similar cyclical behavior across sectors and a very different behavior for trends. Indeed. sectors cyclical components appear as one. In a variance decomposition analysis, prominent sectors such as Manufacturing and Wholesale/Retail Trade exhibit relatively important transitory shocks.
Resumo:
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.
Resumo:
Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.