The failure of early-stage technology startups in Brazil: a study about the contributing factors to the early-death of startups between 2009 and 2014 in Southeastern Brazil

This research aimed to find out which are the main factors that lead technology startups to fail. The study focused on companies located in the Southeast region of Brazil that operated between 2009 and 2014. In the beginning, a review of the literature was done to have a better understanding of basic concepts of entrepreneurship as well as modern techniques for developing entrepreneurship. Furthermore, an analysis of the entrepreneurial scenario in Brazil, with a focus on the Southeast, was also done. After this phase, the qualitative study began, in which 24 specialists from startups were interviewed and asked about which factors were crucial in leading a technology startup to fail. After analyzing the results, four main factors were identified and these factors were validated through a quantitative survey. A questionnaire was then formulated based on the answers from the respondents and distributed to founders and executives of startups, which both failed and succeeded. The questionnaire was answered by 56 companies and their answers were treated with the factor analysis statistical method to check the validity of the questionnaire. Finally, the logistical regression method was used to know the extent to which the factors led to the startups’ failure. In the end, the results obtained suggest that the most significant factor that leads technology startups in southeastern Brazil to fail are problems with interpersonal relationship between partners or investors.

Factors affecting the technical efficiency of production of the Brazilian banking system : a comparison of four statistical models in the context of data envelopment analysis

This paper uses an output oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) measure of technical efficiency to assess the technical efficiencies of the Brazilian banking system. Four approaches to estimation are compared in order to assess the significance of factors affecting inefficiency. These are nonparametric Analysis of Covariance, maximum likelihood using a family of exponential distributions, maximum likelihood using a family of truncated normal distributions, and the normal Tobit model. The sole focus of the paper is on a combined measure of output and the data analyzed refers to the year 2001. The factors of interest in the analysis and likely to affect efficiency are bank nature (multiple and commercial), bank type (credit, business, bursary and retail), bank size (large, medium, small and micro), bank control (private and public), bank origin (domestic and foreign), and non-performing loans. The latter is a measure of bank risk. All quantitative variables, including non-performing loans, are measured on a per employee basis. The best fits to the data are provided by the exponential family and the nonparametric Analysis of Covariance. The significance of a factor however varies according to the model fit although it can be said that there is some agreements between the best models. A highly significant association in all models fitted is observed only for nonperforming loans. The nonparametric Analysis of Covariance is more consistent with the inefficiency median responses observed for the qualitative factors. The findings of the analysis reinforce the significant association of the level of bank inefficiency, measured by DEA residuals, with the risk of bank failure.

An exploration of the lean startup approach among brazilian digital startups

Demais startups abortam por lançar produtos que ninguém compra e o uso de metodologiais tradicionais como o planejamento de negócios e o desenvolvimento rigoroso de produto não conseguiram diminuir o número de falhas de startups. É por isso que uma nova metodologia chamada "The Lean Startup" ganhou, por alguns anos, uma popularidade importante entre os empresários que buscam reduzir o risco de fracasso. A metodologia Lean Startup foi desenvolvida por empresários do Vale do Silício para ajudar startups encontrar o “product/market fit” sem gastar uma enorme quantidade de dinheiro. Além disso, o ambiente de startup brasileira foi crescendo nos últimos anos, na sequência dos últimos sucessos brasileiros. No entanto, poucas pesquisas acadêmicas têm sido realizados para explorar o fenômeno da Lean Startup no Brasil. O objetivo deste relatório é identificar quais são os conceitos da metodologia Lean Startup aplicados no Brasil e entender se a metodologia é adaptada em relação às especificidades do país. Os resultados deste estudo foram coletados por meio de entrevistas com empresários que operam no Brasil. A primeira conclusão é que os empresários brasileiros estão familiarizados com a metodologia Lean Startup e alguns deles têm aplicado os princípios fundamentais. Em segundo lugar, muitos empresários entrevistados encontraram dificuldades na aplicação da metodologia, em particular durante o "get out of the building" fase. Por fim, as entrevistas mostraram que a metodologia Lean Startup nem sempre pode ser relevante para o sucesso no Brasil para os empresarios entrevistados, devido ao tamanho do mercado eo alto nível de competição. Verificou-se que "running fat" em vez de "running lean" pode ser uma estratégia eficiente para vencer no mercado brasileiro em alguns casos especificos.

The consequences of the culture aspect and the power distance in the execution of global strategies in multinational companies in Brazil

One of the challenges presented by the current conjecture in Global Companies is to recognize and understand that the culture and levels in structure of the Power Distance in Organizations in different countries contribute, significantly, toward the failure or success of their strategies. The alignment between the implementation and execution of new strategies for projects intended for the success of the Organization as a whole, rather than as an individual part thereof, is an important step towards reducing the impacts of Power Distance (PDI) on the success of business strategies. A position at odds with this understanding by Companies creates boundaries that increase organizational chasms, also taking into consideration relevant aspects such as, FSAs (Firm-Specific Advantages) and CSAs (Country-Specific Advantages). It is also important that the Organizations based in countries or regions of low Power Distance (PDI) between its individuals be more flexible and prepared to ask and to hear the suggestions from Regional and Local Offices. Thus, the purpose of this study is to highlight the elements of effective strategy implementation considering the relevant aspects at all levels of global corporate culture that justify the influences of power distance when implementing new strategies and also to minimize the impacts of this internal business relationship. This study also recognizes that other corporate and cultural aspects are relevant for the success of business strategies so consider, for instance, the lack of alignment between global and regional/local organizations, the need for competent leadership resources, as well as the challenges that indicate the distance between the hierarchical levels ─ Headquarters and Regional Office ─ as some of the various causes that prevent the successful execution of global strategies. Finally, we show that the execution of the strategy cannot be treated as a construction solely created by the Headquarters or by only one Board and that it needs to be understood as a system aimed at interacting with the surroundings.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.