Decision of using local supplier as a CSR strategy: drivers and benefits for large international companies

A pesquisa aqui apresentada é uma análise detalhada de estratégias de compra associados à Responsabilidade Social Corporativa das empresas multinacionais e visa identificar os elementos que influenciam na escolha de fornecedores locais e os benefícios que tais estratégias podem trazer a estas empresas. A globalização e a pressão por melhores produtos e menores custos levam empresas a repensarem suas decisões de sourcing. Selecionar competências, recursos e ainda escolher onde comprar ou terceirizar, tornou-se uma decisão estratégica fundamental, e muitas multinacionais optam por usar fornecedores locais como um diferencial e uma plataforma de criação de valor para a empresa e para a sociedade. Enquanto esta abordagem reforça a posição de mercado e garante matérias-primas de qualidade a preços justos, o relacionamento com estes fornecedores traz desenvolvimento econômico e social para as comunidades subdesenvolvidas. Estudos sobre fornecedores locais geralmente focam em vantagens competitivas para as empresas, e na adaptação de cadeias de valor para atender estratégias globais de negócios, no entanto, a difusão do conhecimento sobre a criação de valor compartilhado é ainda limitada. Assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi identificar os aspectos de estratégia corporativa, gestão de fornecedores e colaboração que influenciam na criação de valor compartilhado. Dois estudos de casos foram expostos em uma pesquisa qualitativa exploratória com o propósito de avaliar iniciativas que tiveram como base o relacionamento com os fornecedores locais. A análise foi separada em três etapas com o objetivo de identificar (1) influências nas decisões de seleção de fornecedores, (2) aspectos que levam ao sucesso da gestão de fornecedores, e (3) o valor gerado como resultado destas decisões. Conceitos teóricos da CSR, SCM, colaboração e criação de valor compartilhado foram utilizados para apoiar os resultados e as principais conclusões. O resultado da pesquisa revelou que a idéia de co-criação de valor faz parte da cultura da empresa e pode ser considerado um dos motivos pelos quais multinacionais decidem usar fornecedores locais. Contudo, mesmo integrados na estratégia, não garantem criação efetiva de valor compartilhado e diversos componentes em uma estratégia de compras que representam responsabilidade social corporativa devem ser ajustados para motivar mudanças significativas. Ainda, vale lembrar que os elementos de colaboração, tais como a transparência e independência são vitais para melhorar o compromisso entre a multinacional e os negócios locais e criar valor compartilhado.

The life-cycle effects of social security in a model with housing and endogenous benefits

This article develops a life-cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents who make choices of nondurables consumption, investment in homeowned housing and labour supply. Agents retire from an specific age and receive Social Security benefits which are dependant on average past earnings. The model is calibrated, numerically solved and is able to match stylized U.S. aggregate statistics and to generate average life-cycle profiles of its decision variables consistent with data and literature. We also conduct an exercise of complete elimination of the Social Security system and compare its results with the benchmark economy. The results enable us to emphasize the importance of endogenous labour supply and benefits for agents' consumption-smoothing behaviour.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Barriers to entry and development

This paper analyzes the effect of an accountability system in the Brazilian college market. For each discipline, colleges were assigned a grade that depended on the scores of their students on the ENC, an annual mandatory exam. Those grades were then disclosed to the public, giving applicants information about college quality. The system also established rewards and penalties based on the colleges’ grades. I find that the ENC had a substantial effect on different measures of college quality, such as faculty education and the proportion of full-time faculty. The detailed information from this unique dataset and the fact that the ENC started being required for different disciplines in different years allow me to control for time-specific effects, thus minimizing the bias caused by policy endogeneity. Indeed, I find strong evidence on the importance of controlling for time-specific effects: estimates of the impact of the ENC on college quality more than double when I do not take those effects into account. The ENC also affects positively the ratio between applicants and vacancies, and it decreases the faculty and the entering class sizes. The results suggest that its introduction fostered competition and favored colleges entering the market.