Full surplus extraction with dominant strategies

In this note I consider the fuI! surplus extraction in an auction with private but possibly correlated values. I show that fuI! extraction in the continuum of types case is not possible in general. Neither is approximate fuI! surplus extraction if the sel!er is budget constrained.

Development and evaluation of a range anxiety-reducing business model for connected full electric vehicles

This thesis develops and evaluates a business model for connected full electric vehicles (FEV) for the European market. Despite a promoting political environment, various barriers have thus far prevented the FEV from becoming a mass-market vehicle. Besides cost, the most noteworthy of these barriers is represented by range anxiety, a product of FEVs’ limited range, lacking availability of charging infrastructure, and long recharging times. Connected FEVs, which maintain a constant connection to the surrounding infrastructure, appear to be a promising element to overcome drivers’ range anxiety. Yet their successful application requires a well functioning FEV ecosystem which can only be created through the collaboration of various stakeholders such as original equipment manufacturers (OEM), first tier suppliers (FTS), charging infrastructure and service providers (CISP), utilities, communication enablers, and governments. This thesis explores and evaluates how a business model, jointly created by these stakeholders, could look like, i.e. how stakeholders could collaborate in the design of products, services, infrastructure, and advanced mobility management, to meet drivers with a sensible value proposition that is at least equivalent to that of internal combustion engine (ICE) cars. It suggests that this value proposition will be an end-2-end package provided by CISPs or OEMs that comprises mobility packages (incl. pay per mile plans, battery leasing, charging and battery swapping (BS) infrastructure) and FEVs equipped with an on-board unit (OBU) combined with additional services targeted at range anxiety reduction. From a theoretical point of view the thesis answers the question which business model framework is suitable for the development of a holistic, i.e. all stakeholder-comprising business model for connected FEVs and defines such a business model. In doing so the thesis provides the first comprehensive business model related research findings on connected FEVs, as prior works focused on the much less complex scenario featuring only “offline” FEVs.

Full IFRS x lei 11.638 (1ª fase) x lei 6.404: impacto esperado nos resultados de 2010 a partir das empresas que se anteciparam

Este estudo objetiva estimar o impacto esperado do full IFRS no resultado de 2010 a ser reportado pelas empresas brasileiras, a partir da análise das companhias que voluntariamente anteciparam sua adoção nos relatórios de 2008 ou 2009. É aplicado o inverso do “Índice de Conservadorismo” de Gray (1980), renomeado “Índice de Comparabilidade” por Weetman et al. (1998), para determinar o impacto da transição entre os três conjuntos normativos no processo de convergência: da lei 6.404 para a lei 11.638 (primeira fase da transição), da lei 11.638 para o full IFRS (última fase da transição), bem como do processo total (da lei 6.404 para o full IFRS). Os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a hipótese de conservadorismo da contabilidade brasileira preconizado por Gray (1988), sendo apurados aumentos médios no lucro reportado de 44% no exercício de 2007 e de 64% em 2008 e, no patrimônio líquido, de 8,7% em 2007 e 21% em 2008 (todos significativos a pelo menos 5%, exceto o patrimônio líquido de 2004). O estudo também apurou um aumento incremental médio no lucro de 31% em 2007 e de 38% em 2008 (ambos significativos a pelo menos 10%) e de 6,8% e 51%, respectivamente, no patrimônio líquido de 2007 e de 2008 das empresas analisadas (embora só o de 2008 seja significativo a 5%). Assim, prevê-se um novo aumento no lucro e patrimônio líquido das empresas nos relatórios a serem publicados em 2011 em decorrência da aplicação da fase final da convergência para o full IFRS.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.