Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Rules of origin: an unfinished negotiation

Many countries are also engaged in trade negotiations on FTAs. RO are a central theme on each of theses fronts. A detailed analysis of the key questions surrounding the harmonization process is compelling, given that RO talks at the WTO will affect the negotiation of FTAs. Many developing countries are waiting the results from WTO to define their own RO. Since the impasse continues, they are creating their own systems and multiplying different ROs to satisfy their needs. This article seeks to provide some clues why it was impossible, till now, to finish this multilateral negotiation. It is organized as follows: i) review of the main issues in the ARO; ii) present the main points of contention in the harmonization work; iii) analyze the implications of a harmonized system of rules of origin to the other major WTO agreements as well as to other national trade policy instruments; and to present some possible scenarios how to conclude the negotiation