Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

A utilização de modelos de duração para gerenciar risco de crédito

Os modelos hazard, também conhecidos por modelos de tempo até a falência ou duração, são empregados para determinar quais variáveis independentes têm maior poder explicativo na previsão de falência de empresas. Consistem em uma abordagem alternativa aos modelos binários logit e probit, e à análise discriminante. Os modelos de duração deveriam ser mais eficientes que modelos de alternativas discretas, pois levam em consideração o tempo de sobrevivência para estimar a probabilidade instantânea de falência de um conjunto de observações sobre uma variável independente. Os modelos de alternativa discreta tipicamente ignoram a informação de tempo até a falência, e fornecem apenas a estimativa de falhar em um dado intervalo de tempo. A questão discutida neste trabalho é como utilizar modelos hazard para projetar taxas de inadimplência e construir matrizes de migração condicionadas ao estado da economia. Conceitualmente, o modelo é bastante análogo às taxas históricas de inadimplência e mortalidade utilizadas na literatura de crédito. O Modelo Semiparamétrico Proporcional de Cox é testado em empresas brasileiras não pertencentes ao setor financeiro, e observa-se que a probabilidade de inadimplência diminui sensivelmente após o terceiro ano da emissão do empréstimo. Observa-se também que a média e o desvio-padrão das probabilidades de inadimplência são afetados pelos ciclos econômicos. É discutido como o Modelo Proporcional de Cox pode ser incorporado aos quatro modelos mais famosos de gestão de risco .de crédito da atualidade: CreditRisk +, KMV, CreditPortfolio View e CreditMetrics, e as melhorias resultantes dessa incorporação

Conditional treatment and its effect on recidivism

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the 1985 ”Employment Services for Ex-Offenders” (ESEO) program on recidivism. Initially, the sample has been split randomly in a control group and a treatment group. However, the actual treatment (mainly being job related counseling) only takes place conditional on finding a job, and not having been arrested, for those selected in the treatment group. We use a multiple proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity for job seach and recidivism time which incorporates the conditional treatment effect. We find that the program helps to reduce criminal activity, contrary to the result of the previous analysis of this data set. This finding is important for crime prevention policy.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Career concerns: a human capital perspective

We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning by doing, in a life cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns literature can be reversed in the presence of human capital accumulation. Namely, implicit incentives need not decrease over time and may decrease with the degree of uncertainty about an individual's talent. Furthermore, increasing the pre-cision of output measurement can weaken rather than strengthen implicit incentives. Overall, our results contribute to shed new light on the ability of markets to discipline moral hazard in the absence of explicit contracts linking pay to performance.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Mhealth entrepreneurship: an exploratory research for a managerial model for mhealth start ups in low and middle income countries

Since some years, mobile technologies in healthcare (mHealth) stand for the transformational force to improve health issues in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Although several studies have identified the prevailing issue of inconsistent evidence and new evaluation frameworks have been proposed, few have explored the role of entrepreneurship to create disruptive change in a traditionally conservative sector. I argue that improving the effectiveness of mHealth entrepreneurs might increase the adoption of mHealth solutions. Thus, this study aims at proposing a managerial model for the analysis of mHealth solutions from the entrepreneurial perspective in the context of LMICs. I identified the Khoja–Durrani–Scott (KDS) framework as theoretical basis for the managerial model, due to its explicit focus on the context of LMICs. In the subsequent exploratory research I, first, used semi-structured interviews with five specialists in mHealth, local healthcare systems and investment to identify necessary adaptations to the model. The findings of the interviews proposed that especially the economic theme had to be clarified and an additional entrepreneurial theme was necessary. Additionally, an evaluation questionnaire was proposed. In the second phase, I applied the questionnaire to five start-ups, operating in Brazil and Tanzania, and conducted semi-structured interviews with the entrepreneurs to gain practical insights for the theoretical development. Three of five entrepreneurs perceived that the results correlated with the entrepreneurs' expectations of the strengths and weaknesses of the start-ups. Main shortcomings of the model related to the ambiguity of some questions. In addition to the findings for the model, the results of the scores were analyzed. The analysis suggested that across the participating mHealth start-ups the ‘behavioral and socio-technical’ outcomes were the strongest and the ‘policy’ outcomes were the weakest themes. The managerial model integrates several perspectives, structured around the entrepreneur. In order to validate the model, future research may link the development of a start-up with the evolution of the scores in longitudinal case studies or large-scale tests.