How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state a§ect the aggregated level of individuals and small businessesí loans. Higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to Öle for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credit. On the other hand, lower levels of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. ConÖrming the theoretical claims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuals and small businesses, where the optimal level of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in U.S. do not apply the optimal level, an intervention that brings the exemption level closer to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Capitalização do imposto de propriedade no preço de mercado dos imóveis

Esta dissertação estima e discute a capitalização do imposto de propriedade no preço de imóveis, isto é, quanto um aumento de IPTU reduz os preços de imóveis e vice-versa. Por um modelo de diferença em diferenças e algumas tentativas de falseamento, obtiveram-se fortes evidências de capitalização, onde, em média, 100% de variação no imposto altera por volta de 30% o preço dos imóveis. Com isto, políticas de isenção ou redução de IPTU com fins sociais podem ser questionadas, pois dificultariam o acesso à moradia das famílias mais pobres, contribuindo para o processo de favelização. Ao mesmo tempo, maiores patamares do imposto poderiam ser utilizados não somente para elevar as receitas municipais ou como contrapartida ao uso de serviços públicos locais, mas também para tornar os preços dos imóveis mais acessíveis, reduzindo a pobreza e estimulando o crescimento das cidades.

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state affect the aggregated leveI of individuaIs and small businesses' loans. Higher leveIs of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to file for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credito On the other hand, lower leveIs of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. Confirming the theoretical daims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuaIs and small businesses, where the optimal leveI of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in V.S. do not apply the optimallevel, an intervention that brings the exemption leveI doser to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.