Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Exact arbitrage, well-diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets

: In a model of a nancial market with an atomless continuum of assets, we give a precise and rigorous meaning to the intuitive idea of a \well-diversi ed" portfolio and to a notion of \exact arbitrage". We show this notion to be necessary and su cient for an APT pricing formula to hold, to be strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of \asymptotic arbitrage", and to have novel implications for the continuity of the cost functional as well as for various versions of APT asset pricing. We further justify the idealized measure-theoretic setting in terms of a pricing formula based on \essential" risk, one of the three components of a tri-variate decomposition of an asset's rate of return, and based on a speci c index portfolio constructed from endogenously extracted factors and factor loadings. Our choice of factors is also shown to satisfy an optimality property that the rst m factors always provide the best approximation. We illustrate how the concepts and results translate to markets with a large but nite number of assets, and relate to previous work.

Neutralizing the tendency to the overvaluation of the exchange rate or assuming a foreign constraint and asking for foreign savings

The objectives of these notes are two. The first objective is to analyze whether the strategy of growth with absorption of foreign savings leads to a trajectory of the economy that is sustainable in the long run. The second one is to evaluate the possibility of success of a policy of administered devaluation of the exchange rate in Brazil.