O agir humano como um desvio necessário do equilibrio contigente

O enfoque no agir humano, como um desvio necessário à manutenção do equilíbrio contingente do sistema, deve perpassar pela análise das características e dos fundamentos de diferentes correntes éticas, que servem de "pano de fundo" para o convívio moral dos agentes, nos ambientes organizacionais e sociais (sistemas interagentes). Em outros termos, como essa forma de criação e socialização de um conhecimento organizacional, vista como fundamento para o desenvolvimento das ciências administrativas, ancorada numa fundamentação ou nas diferentes correntes éticas, pode criar um conjunto de valores aceitos e justificados moralmente num ambiente interno de uma organização, e de que forma o agir humano poderá ser exteriorizado numa sociedade, uma vez que os atores que participam de um sistema organizacional são os mesmos que atuam no ambiente social de uma comunidade, estado, país, e no mercado global. Isto é, de que forma o agir humano, com base numa ética justificadora do ato moral, pode contribuir para o equilíbrio dinâmico do sistema contingencial.

Modelo de equilibrio geral para simulação de políticas de distribuição de renda e crescimento no Brasil

Apresenta os resultados de um projeto de pesquisa que tem como objetivo a construção de um Modelo Aplicado de Equilíbrio Geral para a Economia Brasileira ("Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model"), voltado para a simulação de políticas públicas de crescimento e distribuição de renda. Após a caracterização e apresentação do modelo adotado ("Brasil CGE 95"), são realizadas treze simulações, onde comparam-se os resultados do ano base (95) com os obtidos em cada experimento, incluindo: indicadores macroeconômicos (PIB, Consumo, Déficit Público, Balança ComerciaL.), a remuneração anual dos dez fatores de produção do modelo (oito tipos de trabalho, dois tipos de capital ), a renda anual dos nove grupos de famílias do modelo, indicadores de pobreza/distribuição e indicadores variados como o emprego/produção setorial, taxa de câmbio real e o índice relativo de preços

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Avenues to success : electoral strategies and ambition in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

In the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber ofDeputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and again 75% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% ofthem in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target of Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-Iegislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not alIlegislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume alI of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vicegovernor). A minority still, may run for state leveI offices (regressive ambition).Given that static and progressive ambition are the two main types of career choice in Brazil, we focus on the factors that influence the career decision and electoral success of those who choose to run for reelection and those who choose to run for higher-level offices, i.e. senator and governor. We use data recently colIected from the 2002 elections.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Exposing corrupt politicians : the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountabil- ity. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the e®ects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio sta- tions. These ¯ndings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

Polarización y resaca electoral en Brasil

Concluidas las exasperadas elecciones de 2014, el país pasa por un momento delicado. Por un lado, es esperado que la nueva composición del gobierno busque un tono de reconciliación posicionándose de una manera más moderada que permita el funcionamiento del modelo de gobierno de coalición aun en práctica. Por otro, ya queda evidente que será un arduo y doloroso proceso en virtud a la intensa polarización política que, a pesar de apuntar tendencias de distensión sigue un expresivo elemento en la conducción de la política brasileña