Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Organizational design as an enabler for innovation: evidence from a German Mechanical Engineering Company

Over the past two decades there has been a profusion of empirical studies of organizational design and its relationship to efficiency, productivity and flexibility of an organization. In parallel, there has been a wide range of studies about innovation management in different kind of industries and firms. However, with some exceptions, the organizational and innovation management bodies of literature tend to examine the issues of organizational design and innovation management individually, mainly in the context of large firms operating at the technological frontier. There seems to be a scarcity of empirical studies that bring together organizational design and innovation and examine them empirically and over time in the context of small and medium sized enterprises. This dissertation seeks to provide a small contribution in that direction. This dissertation examines the dynamic relationship between organizational design and innovation. This relationship is examined on the basis of a single-case design in a medium sized mechanical engineering company in Germany. The covered time period ranges from 1958 until 2009, although the actual focus falls on the recent past. This dissertation draws on first-hand qualitative empirical evidence gathered through extensive field work. The main findings are: 1. There is always a bundle of organizational dimensions which impacts innovation. These main organizational design dimensions are: (1) Strategy & Leadership, (2) Resources & Capabilities, (3) Structure, (4) Culture, (5) Networks & Partnerships, (6) Processes and (7) Knowledge Management. However, the importance of the different organizational design dimensions changes over time. While for example for the production of simple, standardized parts, a simple organizational design was appropriate, the company needed to have a more advanced organizational design in order to be able to produce customized, complex parts with high quality. Hence the technological maturity of a company is related to its organizational maturity. 2. The introduction of innovations of the analyzed company were highly dependent on organizational conditions which enabled their introduction. The results of the long term case study show, that some innovations would not have been introduced successfully if the organizational elements like for example training and qualification, the build of network and partnerships or the acquisition of appropriate resources and capabilities, were not in place. Hence it can be concluded, that organizational design is an enabling factor for innovation. These findings contribute to advance our understanding of the complex relationship between organizational design and innovation. This highlights the growing importance of a comprehensive, innovation stimulating organizational design of companies. The results suggest to managers that innovation is not only dependent on a single organizational factor but on the appropriate, comprehensive design of the organization. Hence manager should consider to review regularly the design of their organizations in order to maintain a innovation stimulating environment.

Internationalization of professional service firms: the case of a brazilian engineering consultancy company

A importância do tema da internacionalização é crescente, tanto para empresas quanto para seus administradores. É praticamente impossível permanecer alheio à globalização e às suas conseqüências; mesmo que uma empresa opte por permanecer em seu mercado local, pode ser necessário considerar os efeitos de concorrentes baseados no exterior. Hoje, além de grandes corporações, pequenas e medias empresas também tem se internacionalizado. Empresas prestadoras de serviços profissionais, como consultoria de engenharia, não são exceção, e alguns fatores contribuem para o interesse em estudar este setor específico. Em primeiro lugar, deve-se considerar a sua importância para a sociedade, especialmente os países em desenvolvimento, os quais frequentemente sofrem com a carência de investimentos em infra-estrutura. Além disso, existe também a possibilidade de estabelecer analogias entre este e outros serviços de consultoria, como os de advogados, contadores e administradores. Finalmente, contribui para o interesse o fato de que o ativo principal destas empresas é o conhecimento, o qual tem se tornado cada vez mais um aspecto chave para o desempenho e lucratividade das empresas. O objetivo deste estudo é explorar o processo de internacionalização de empresas brasileiras de consultoria de engenharia, identificando os maiores obstáculos, dificuldades e fontes de desvantagem enfrentados por estas empresas na sua internacionalização. Paralelamente, foram realizados esforços para identificar vantagens competitivas que pudessem compensar estas dificuldades. A fim de atingir este objetivo, foi realizado um estudo de caso, focado em uma companhia com uma dúzia de projetos internacionais. Este procedimento permitiu constatações interessantes; espera-se que as informações obtidas e as recomendações decorrentes possam contribuir para iniciativas futuras de internacionalização de pequenas e médias empresas de serviços profissionais.

Contratos relacionais na indústria aeronáutica brasileira : um estudo empírico do modelo de parcerias de risco da Embraer

O presente trabalho é um estudo empírico das práticas contratuais adotadas pela EMBRAER posteriormente ao seu processo de privatização em 1994, e do arranjo contratual empregado para viabilizar a realização dos projetos de aeronaves responsáveis pelo ressurgimento da empresa ao final da década 1990. Aspecto fundamental da engenharia contratual empreendida foi a formação das chamadas Parcerias de Risco entre a Embraer e um grupo selecionado de fornecedores-chave visando o co-desenvolvimento das aeronaves. A análise das informações obtidas na pesquisa aponta a importância epistemológica de se utilizar novos instrumentos de análise que permitam compreender melhor as práticas contratuais empregadas e seu papel no desenvolvimento. Assim, utilizamos a teoria relacional dos contratos como lente teórica para analisar o modelo de parcerias de risco e, por meio dela, investigar qual o papel exercido pelos elementos relacionais no sucesso dos programas ERJ 145 e EMBRAER 170/190. A hipótese central que norteia o trabalho é a de que, no inovador arranjo contratual que envolveu a Embraer, fornecedores estrangeiros e o BNDES, a relação contratual foi construída por meio de mecanismos promissórios e não-promissórios de projeção de trocas, e os padrões de normatividade estabelecidos entre as partes transcenderam o contrato escrito. A contribuição da teoria relacional dos contratos para a análise de tais práticas possui duplo caráter. A primeiro contribuição é eminentemente descritiva, ao fornecer um instrumental teórico mais abrangente e poderoso para compreender a real dinâmica das práticas contratuais em análise. A segunda contribuição, de natureza normativa, consiste em explicitar aspectos relacionais que compõem, juntamente com os elementos promissórios, uma certa normatividade interna ao contrato que informa a conduta dos agentes ao longo da relação. Nos programas ERJ 145 e EMBRAER 170/90, procuramos demonstrar como a formulação de um arranjo contratual mais relacional em substituição ao tradicional conjunto de relações contratuais de fornecimento descontínuas, foi fundamental para o sucesso dos projetos e até mesmo para a sua própria viabilização. Nesse sentido, a teoria relacional dos contratos fornece categorias de análise que não apenas oferecem um ferramental teórico mais adequado para descrever relações como a do caso em estudo, mas também fornece, por meio de uma descrição mais rica e abrangente, lições sobre como desenhar contratos. Isto é importante para demonstrar como a problemática das dimensões implícitas do contratos transcende o campo da teoria contratual e da justiça contratual e apresenta-se de grande relevância para a agenda de pesquisa em Direito e Desenvolvimento.

Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states

A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. However, empirical studies which document evidence about the return on campaign donations are rare (Großer, Reuben and Tymula, 2013). In this paper we estimate the net expected return of a campaign donation in eight Brazilian states using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to separate the return of winning and losing state deputy candidates in the electoral coalition in 2006. Our results show that that the net return is quite high (i.e., the investment of donor firms is almost 2% of the net expected return), and is larger among traditional electoral parties than any other parties, on average. Looking at the heterogeneity of local executive and legislative levels, we find that net returns are higher when donor firms finance deputies within a governor’s electoral coalition than deputies outside this coalition.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Forecasting daily volatility using high frequency financial data

Aiming at empirical findings, this work focuses on applying the HEAVY model for daily volatility with financial data from the Brazilian market. Quite similar to GARCH, this model seeks to harness high frequency data in order to achieve its objectives. Four variations of it were then implemented and their fit compared to GARCH equivalents, using metrics present in the literature. Results suggest that, in such a market, HEAVY does seem to specify daily volatility better, but not necessarily produces better predictions for it, what is, normally, the ultimate goal. The dataset used in this work consists of intraday trades of U.S. Dollar and Ibovespa future contracts from BM&FBovespa.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Informal labor contracts: an analysis of the Brazilian experience

For representing an expressive souree of labor absorption, the jobs with informal labor eontraet have been reeeiving a eonsiderable attention among the speeialists in the Brazilian labor rnarket. This paper presents, eoneisely, some stylized faets about this labor rnarket segment, as well as some oftheir most eommon interpretations. We argue that sue h interpretations are, in general, not very integrated and a model trying to make them eompatible is developed. The model ineorporates both segmentation and workers with heterogeneity in qualifieation. The results of the analysis are shown to be eompatible with most of the observed faets.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.