Equilibria in exchange economies with financial constraints : beyond the Cass trick

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financiaI markets with purely financiaI securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass [4], Duffie [7] and Florenzano-Gourdel [12] proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium security prices. This result is based on a trick initiated by Cass [4] in which one unconstrained agent behaves as if he were in complete markets. This approach is unsatisfactory since it is asymmetric and no more valid when every agent is subject to frictions. We propose a new and symmetric approach to prove that arbitrage-free security prices still fully characterize equilibrium security prices in the more realistic situation where the financiaI market is constrained by convex restrictions, provided that financiaI markets are collectively frictionless.

Dual resource transfers and interruption in external debt service

Externai debt service requires a dual resource transfer. Trade surpluses have to be generated in order to make foreign exchange revenues available for debt repayment. In addition, with developing countries' externai debt being largely a public liability, debt service requires that resources can be effectively transferred from the private to the public sector. This paper derives a statistical model for dealing with dual constraints in the presence of binary dependent variables and applies it to the dual resource transfer problem. The results from the estimation of the model for a sample of 31 middle-income developing countries in the period of 1980 to 1990, strongly support the hypothesis that both externai and fiscal constraints are important in explaining externai debt service disruptions.

Joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with projected linear decision rules

We consider multistage stochastic linear optimization problems combining joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with hard constraints. We develop a method for projecting decision rules onto hard constraints of wait-and-see type. We establish the relation between the original (in nite dimensional) problem and approximating problems working with projections from di erent subclasses of decision policies. Considering the subclass of linear decision rules and a generalized linear model for the underlying stochastic process with noises that are Gaussian or truncated Gaussian, we show that the value and gradient of the objective and constraint functions of the approximating problems can be computed analytically.

Wealth composition, endogenous fertility and the dynamics of income inequality

This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in tum influence the dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoffbetween quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments, in which weaIth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the crosssection relationship between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattem, reflecting differences in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth. Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their bOlTowing constraints, the negative effect of weaIth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both implications .

Food waste in lower-middle income households: a qualitative analysis of antecedents and a typology of food wasters

Esta dissertação doutoral, com base em dados empíricos coletados com 50 mães distribuídas no Brasil (n = 30) e nos EUA (n = 20), tem como objetivo fornecer uma melhor compreensão do desperdício de alimento no contexto da baixa renda. A tese é composta por três artigos, que combinados, cumprem os objetivos de identificar os antecedentes do desperdício de alimento e delinear uma tipologia dos desperdiçadores de alimento. Adicionalmente, contextualiza o desperdício global e um capítulo propõe uma agenda futura para estudos sobre desperdício de alimento no âmbito do consumidor. O desperdício de alimento nas famílias, enquanto tema de pesquisa, oferece a oportunidade para o trabalho acadêmico em marketing cumprir os critérios de relevância social, gerencial e para políticas públicas. No primeiro estudo, descrevem-se os fatores do chamado "paradoxo do desperdício de alimento", a identificação e análise do desperdício de alimento em famílias com restrições orçamentárias, enquanto apresentam-se o itinerário do consumo de alimentos e os antecedentes do desperdício. Este primeiro artigo, elaborado com dados coletados em famílias brasileiras, ilustra também o papel das normas culturais, tais como o preparo abundante de alimento para mostrar hospitalidade ou como forma de não ser percebido como pobre, no aumento do desperdício. No segundo artigo, uma grounded-theory (teoria fundamentada nos dados) destaca o papel do afeto e da abundância no desperdício de alimento familiar. Para enriquecer as contribuições teóricas, este segundo estudo apresenta um framework com seis dimensões do desperdício de alimento (1. Afeto; 2. Abundância; 3. Multiplicidade de escolhas; 4. Conveniência; 5. Procrastinação; 6. Rotina sem planejamento). Baseado em dados empíricos coletados em famílias americanas, este estudo proporciona novas explicações, a exemplo de como o estoque abundante de comfort foods - uma forma de impulsionar tanto emoções positivas para si quanto mostrar afeto para crianças – pode gerar mais desperdício de alimentos. Em síntese, o segundo artigo identifica uma consequência negativa do afeto e da abundância de alimentos no contexto familiar, e apresenta um framework teoricamente relevante. Finalmente, o terceiro artigo, a partir do conjunto de dados dos estudos anteriores e de nova coleta com dez famílias, propõe uma tipologia comportamental do desperdício de alimento, uma contribuição original aos estudos de comportamento do consumidor. A identificação de cinco tipos de desperdiçadores de alimentos - (1) Mães carinhosas; (2) Cozinheiras abundantes; (3) Desperdiçadoras de sobras; (4) Procrastinadoras; (5) Mães versáteis - contribui para a teoria, enquanto implicações potenciais para educadores nutricionais e agentes públicos são exploradas a partir dos resultados. Como uma forma de explicar as características de cada um dos cinco tipos identificados, compara-se aspectos das amostras brasileira e norte-americana, que apresentam similaridades no comportamento de desperdício de alimento. Os níveis de desperdício percebidos por país também são comparados. Em suma, os achados dos três artigos podem contribuir para maximizar os resultados de campanhas de conscientização voltadas à mitigação do desperdício de alimento, e apresentam ideias para varejistas interessados em iniciativas de sustentabilidade. Mais abrangentemente, os resultados apresentados também podem ser aplicados para incrementar programas de combate à fome e projetos de educação nutricional realizados pelo setor público ou ONGs.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.