How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Life expectancy, educational attainment, and fertility choice

This paper explores the role of mortality as a determinant of educational attainment and fertility, both during the demographic transition and after its completion. Two main points distinguish our analysis from the previous ones. Together with the investments of parents in the human capital of children, traditional in the fertility literature, we introduce investments of adult individuals (parents) in their own education, which ultimately determines productivity in both the goods and household sectors. Second, we let adult longevity affect the way parents value each individual child. Increases in adult longevity or reductions in child mortality eventually raise the investments in adult education. Together with the higher utility derived from each child, this tilts the quality-quantity trade off towards less and better educated children, and increases the growth rate of the economy. This setup can explain both the demographic transition and the recent behavior of fertility in “post-transition” countries. Evidence from historical experiences of demographic transition, and from the recent behavior of fertility, education, and growth generally supports the predictions of the model.