Tratamento de reclamações: estudo exploratório junto às empresas de serviços públicos urbanos

Estuda o consumerismo, o consumerismo no Brasil e investiga o tratamento que as empresas de serviços públicos dispensam às reclamações, através de pesquisa a 3 universos: o PROCON, 9 executivos de 4 empresas governamentais de serviços públicos e ,40 consumidores reclamantes.

Essays on the monetary aspects of the term structure of nominal interest rates

Interest rates are key economic variables to much of finance and macroeconomics, and an enormous amount of work is found in both fields about the topic. Curiously, in spite of their common interest, finance and macro research on the topic have seldom interacted, using different approaches to address its main issues with almost no intersection. Concerned with interest rate contingent claims, finance term structure models relate interest rates to lagged interest rates; concerned with economic relations and macro dynamics, macro models regress a few interest rates on a wide variety of economic variables. If models are true though simplified descriptions of reality, the relevant factors should be captured by both the set of bond yields and that of economic variables. Each approach should be able to address the other field concerns with equal emciency, since the economic variables are revealed by the bond yields and these by the economic variables.

Economic growth with foreign saving?

Highly indebted countries, particularly the Latin American ones, presented dismal economic outcomes in the 1990s, which are the consequence of the ‘growth cum foreign savings strategy’, or the Second Washington Consensus. Coupled with liberalization of international financial flows, such strategy, which did not make part of the first consensus, led the countries, in the wave of a new world wide capital flow cycle, to high current account deficits and increase in foreign debt, ignoring the solvency constraint and the debt threshold. In practical terms it involved overvalued currencies (low exchange rates) and high interest rates; in policy terms, the attempt to control de budget deficit while the current account deficit was ignored. The paradoxical consequence was the adoption by highly indebted countries of ‘exchange rate populism’, a less obvious but more dangerous form of economic populism.

Exchange rate policies, patterns of specialization and economic development: theory and evidence in developing countries

The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it intends to provide theoretical elements to analyze the relation between real exchange rates and economic development. Our main hypothesis is very much in line with the Dutch disease literature, and states that competitive currencies contribute to the existence and maintenance of the anufacturing sector in the economy. This, in turn, brings about higher growth rates in the long run, given the existence of increasing returns in the industrial sector, and its importance in generating echnological change and increasing productivity in the overall economy. The second objective of this paper is empirical. It intends to analyze examples of successful exchange rate policies, such as Chile and Indonesia in the eighties, as a benchmark for comparison with countries where currency overvaluation has taken place, such as Brazil. In the latter case, the local currency is being inflated by large capital inflows, due to high domestic interest rates and to a boom in demand and prices of commodities in the international markets. It will be argued that the industrial sector bears most of the burden when the currency appreciates, and that Brazil risks at deindustrialization if there are no changes in the exchange rate regime

Public debt and the limits of fiscal policy to increase economic growth

Research that seeks to estimate the effects of fiscal policies on economic growth has ignored the role of public debt in this relationship. This study proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth, which demonstrates that the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio should negatively impact the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This occurs because government indebtedness extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are no longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings rate of the economy. The major conclusions of the theoretical model were tested using an econometric model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls for timeinvariant, country-specific heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in the model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

Financial globalization and economic growth

Capital mobility leads to a speed of convergence smaller in an open economy than in a closed economy. This is related to the presence of two capitals, produced with specific technologies, and where one of the capitals is nontradable, like infrastructures or human capital. Suppose, for example, that the economy is relatively less abundant in human capital, leading to a decrease of the remuneration of this capital during the transition. In a closed economy, the remuneration of physical capital will be increasing during the transition. In the open economy, the alternative investment yields the international interest rate, corresponding to the steady state net remuneration of physical capital in the closed economy. The nonarbitrage condition shows a larger difference in the remuneration of the two capitals in the closed economy. It leads to a higher accumulation of human capital and thus to a faster speed of convergence in the closed economy. This result stands in sharp contrast with that of the one-sector neoclassical growth model, where the speed of convergence is smaller in the closed economy.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.