Are CGE Models still useful in economic policy making?

This paper develops background considerations to help better framing the results of a CGE exercise. Three main criticisms are usually addressed to CGE efforts. First, they are too aggregate, their conclusions failing to shed light on relevant sectors or issues. Second, they imply huge data requirements. Timeliness is frequently jeopardised by out-dated sources, benchmarks referring to realities gone by. Finally, results are meaningless, as they answer wrong or ill-posed questions. Modelling demands end up by creating a rather artificial context, where the original questions lose content. In spite of a positive outlook on the first two, crucial questions lie in the third point. After elaborating such questions, and trying to answer some, the text argues that CGE models can come closer to reality. If their use is still scarce to give way to a fruitful symbiosis between negotiations and simulation results, they remain the only available technique providing a global, inter-related way of capturing economy-wide effects of several different policies. International organisations can play a major role supporting and encouraging improvements. They are also uniquely positioned to enhance information and data sharing, as well as putting people from various origins together, to share their experiences. A serious and complex homework is however required, to correct, at least, the most dangerous present shortcomings of the technique.

Brazilian regional development distribution, evidences for socio-economic policy

As to many Latin american countries, the impacts of the recent economic globalization on the Brazilian economy have revealed a diversified tendency in spatial development when regional economic indicators are observed. This is due to the specificities or each region, as regard their sector structure, the availability of human resources and the degree of technological innovation undertaken by local enterprises. From a situation of regional inequalities observed in lhe socio-economic levels of development at the beginning of the eighties the dynamics of the Brazilian regional evolution has presented different speeds and intensities in the several spaees. This paper aims to evaluate the dynamics of Brazilian regional development during the 1985-95 period and the impacts over the working population and regional disparities in order to offer some elements to assist social and economic policy. For this purpose Dispersion Quotients and Dispersion lntensity Coefficients were calculated based on two variables, the Regional Gross Domestic Product anel the Working Population. The results of the analysis confirm the existence of considerable regional disparities and it was observed that thc sector and regional redistribution of the GDP indicate that in a general way, no remarkable changes occurred in the regional development in the period. The results show that although the economic policies did stimulate a global convergence process of the per capita product among regions, those policies did not attenuate economic dynamism concentration to the desired extent.

Brazil and Turkey, a comparative analysis of both countries' economic development and institutional design from the Great Depression to the early 21st century

Apos uma década de rápido crescimento econômico na primeira década do século 21, Brasil e Turquia foram considerados duas das economias emergentes mais dinâmicas e promissoras. No entanto, vários sinais de dificuldades econômicas e tensões políticas reapareceram recentemente e simultaneamente nos dois países. Acreditamos que esses sinais e a sua simultaneidade podem ser entendidos melhor com um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história econômica dos dois países, que revela ser surpreendentemente paralela. Numa primeira parte, empreendemos uma comparação abrangente da história econômica brasileira e turca para mostrar as numerosas similaridades entre os desafios de política econômica que os dois países enfrentaram, assim como entre as respostas que eles lhes deram desde a virada da Grande Depressão até a primeira década do século 21. Essas escolhas de política econômica comuns dão forma a uma trajetória de desenvolvimento notavelmente análoga, caracterizada primeiro pela adoção do modelo de industrialização por substituição das importações (ISI) no contexto da recessão mundial dos anos 1930; depois pela intensificação e crise final desse modelo nos anos 1980; e finalmente por duas décadas de estabilização e transição para um modelo econômico mais liberal. Numa segunda parte, o desenvolvimento das instituições econômicas e políticas, assim como da economia política subjacente nos dois países, são analisados comparativamente a fim de prover alguns elementos de explicação do paralelo observado na primeira parte. Sustentamos que o marco institucional estabelecido nos dois países durante esse período também têm varias características fundamentais em comum e contribui a explicar as escolhas de política econômica e as performances econômicas comparáveis, detalhadas na primeira parte. Este estudo aborda elementos do contexto histórico úteis para compreender a situação econômica e política atual nos dois países. Potencialmente também constitui uma tentativa de considerar as economias emergentes numa perspectiva histórica e comparativa mais ampla para entender melhor as suas fraquezas institucionais e adotar um olhar mais equilibrado sobre seu potencial econômico.

Fiscal policy in Brazil: from counter-cyclical response to crisis

The main goal of this article is to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output in Brazil from 1997 to 2014, and, more specifically, to estimate those effects when the output falls below its potential level. To do so, we estimate VAR (vector autoregressive) models to generate impulse-response functions and causality/endogeneity tests. Our most remarkable results indicate the following channel of economic policy in Brazil: to foster output, government spending increases causing increases in both tax rates and revenue and the short-term interest rate. A fiscal stimulus via spending seems efficient for economic performance as well as monetary policy; however, the latter operates pro-cyclically in the way we defined here, while the former is predominantly countercyclical. As the monetary shock had a negative effect on GDP growth and GDP growth responded positively to the fiscal shock, it seems that the economic policy has given poise to growth with one hand and taken it with the other one. The monetary policy is only reacting to the fiscal stimuli. We were not able to find any statistically significant response of the output to tax changes, but vice versa seems work in the Brazilian case.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The economics of wage-led recovery: analysis and policy recommendations

The financial crisis and Great Recession have been followed by a jobs shortage crisis that most forecasts predict will persist for years given current policies. This paper argues for a wage-led recovery and growth program which is the only way to remedy the deep causes of the crisis and escape the jobs crisis. Such a program is the polar opposite of the current policy orthodoxy, showing how much is at stake. Winning the argument for wage-led recovery will require winning the war of ideas about economics that has its roots going back to Keynes’ challenge of classical macroeconomics in the 1920s and 1930s. That will involve showing how the financial crisis and Great Recession were the ultimate result of three decades of neoliberal policy, which produced wage stagnation by severing the wage productivity growth link and made asset price inflation and debt the engine of demand growth in place of wages; showing how wage-led policy resolves the current problem of global demand shortage without pricing out labor; and developing a detailed set of policy proposals that flow from these understandings. The essence of a wage-led policy approach is to rebuild the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy that fills the current demand shortfall so as to push the economy on to a recovery path. Both sets of measures are necessary. Expansionary macro policy (i.e. fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy) without rebuilding the wage mechanism will not produce sustainable recovery and may end in fiscal crisis. Rebuilding the wage mechanism without expansionary macro policy is likely to leave the economy stuck in the orbit of stagnation.