Do higher moments really matter in portfolio choice?

We present explicit formulas for evaluating the difference between Markowitz weights and those from optimal portfolios, with the same given return, considering either asymmetry or kurtosis. We prove that, whenever the higher moment constraint is not binding, the weights are never the same. If, due to special features of the first and second moments, the difference might be negligible, in quite many cases it will be very significant. An appealing illustration, when the designer wants to incorporate an asset with quite heavy tails, but wants to moderate this effect, further supports the argument.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

On the construction of explicit exponential based schemes for Stiff SDEs

Trabalho apresentado Numerical Solution of Differential and Differential-Algebraic Equations (NUMDIFF-14), Halle, 7-11 Sep 2015