Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa--Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008).

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision

This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since "all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure". We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.

O processo de humanização: as bases constitutivas da subjetividade

Iniciando-se por uma descrição longitudinal, seguida de interpretação "a posteriori", obteve-se categorias relativas a cada dimensão do psiquismo. Estas, em seu caráter de transversalidade, foram tomadas como esteios para as explicações acerca da passagem do sujeito da condição biológica à condição de sujeito falante. O norteamento dessa análise teve como ponto de partida a postulação acerca dessas dimensões, dos aspectos relativos as mesmas, e dos efetores referentes por essa passagem, cujo início tem a esses aspectos que respondem lugar quando a mãe se dispõe a apontar para o sujeito o limite entre o núcleo filogenético e as transformações sócio-histórica. A partir dessa delimitação, ocorre a assimilação de características, tipicamente humanas para, enfim, serem fixados pela lei paterna, os limites do “tornar-se humano”. Nesse ínterim, são observadas ocorrências relativas as dimensões mencionadas. Tratando-se de permanência de conteúdos mantidos fora do campo da simbolização, e excluídos da matriz imaginária, tem-se então a caracterização do real ~elo seu mecanismo específico: a foraclusão. Ainda se situa a pulsão no seu caráter impensável e inominável. Já as ações resultantes do recalcamento originário concorrem para a formação de marcas não-simbolizáveis que, como faceta do imaginário, se vinculam às informações do núcleo filogenético referentes aos protofantasmas, aqui considerado corno outra faceta desta dimensão. No que concerne ao simbólico, registra-se a significação como fundante da condição humana, resultante do recalcamento propriamente dito. Sendo assim, a humanização enquanto explicada pelo conceito de recalcamento, conforme evidencia a metapsicologia freudiana, não açambarça todas as nuances relativas ao humano; visto englobar apenas aquilo que é imaginado corno fantasma ou aquilo que e apresentado simbolicamente. Por isso, a utilização do conceito de foraclusão, da perspectiva lacaniana, justifica-se pelo fato de oferecer uma visão mais completa dessa dinâmica. Desse modo, se pode incluir no escopo do "tornar-se humano", aqueles elementos não passíveis de simbolização, bem como aqueles da realidade pulsional que não se apresentam no texto do fantasma; mas que, ao se constituírem como um "pano-de-fundo", possibilitam que a conteúdos simbólicos e imaginários viabilizem a socialização. De resto, a socialização é um processo que, originado do simbólico, se assenta no imaginário tomado como base. Para isto, o real, em seu efeito marginal, possibilita o retorno ao simbólico. A partir daí, se verifica a utilização dos elementos culturais, que são descobertos em função daquilo que a atividade fantasmática suscita.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.