The costs of education, longevity and the poverty of nations

This paper explores the distortions on the cost of education, associated with government policies and institutional factors, as an additional determinant of cross-country income differences. Agents are finitely lived and the model takes into account life-cycle features of human capital accumulation. There are two sectors, one producing goods and the other providing educational services. The model is calibrated and simulated for 89 economies. We find that human capital taxation has a relevant impact on incomes, which is amplified by its indirect effect on returns to physical capital. Life expectancy plays an important role in determining long-run output: the expansion of the population working life increases the present value of the flow of wages, which induces further human capital investment and raises incomes. Although in our simulations the largest gains are observed when productivity is equated across countries, changes in longevity and in the incentives to educational investment are too relevant to ignore.

On the consistency of arbitrary money-demand functions with the Sidrauski and the shopping-time models

This paper investigates which properties money-demand functions have to satisfy to be consistent with multidimensional extensions of Lucasí(2000) versions of the Sidrauski (1967) and the shopping-time models. We also investigate how such classes of models relate to each other regarding the rationalization of money demands. We conclude that money demand functions rationalizable by the shoppingtime model are always rationalizable by the Sidrauski model, but that the converse is not true. The log-log money demand with an interest-rate elasticity greater than or equal to one and the semi-log money demand are counterexamples.

Analysis of the restructuring of the Russian defence industry (by the example of aviation industry and knaapo) and the creation of United Aviation Construction Corporation

The present study is focused on the analysis of the three main governmental measures occurred in 2000-2006 in Russian defense industry: the creation of the holding structures, the establishing of the state monopoly in arms export, and creation of the United Aviation Construction Corporation (Ob¿edinennaya Aviastroitel¿naya Corporatziya), which was initiated by the President and Government of Russian Federation in 2006. The last project assumes the consolidation and joining of all producers of civil and military aviation into one united corporation in order to save the technological and productive potential of the sector after serious crisis in 1990-s. On the other hand, this project can be considered as one of the measures to establish state control and hierarchy in the defense industry. The current project tries to analyze the necessity and the possible impacts of restructuring processes. In order to perform such analysis, I need to observe the evolution of the sector, which involves the description of the restructuring and reforming of the industry since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current situation in aviation sector was shaped by number of reforms performed by Government of Russian Federation, which I describe in phases: conversion, privatization, decentralization, followed by evident desire of the state to establish control over some companies. Later on, I am trying to understand the reasons lying behind all reforms of 2000-2006 and the integration of the industry. I also try to predict which impacts on the companies it will have. The last part presents the main conclusions of the paper.

Mobility, information, and bequest : the other side of the equal division puzzle

There is substantial empirical evidence that parental bequests to their children are typically equal in the US – a regularity inconsistent with the predictions of standard optimizing bequest models. The prior explanation for this puzzle is parents’ desire to signal equal affection given children’s incomplete information of parental preferences. However, parents also have incomplete information regarding children and the implications of this side of the information set have not previously been considered. Using a strategic bequest framework we show that when parents have sufficient uncertainty regarding children’s returns to relocation a separating equilibrium in which parents reward attentive heirs with larger bequests is precluded. We argue that such uncertainty is consistent with conditions in the contemporary US.