Automação e robótica nas indústrias brasileiras: um estudo exploratório

A Automação e o processo de Robotização vêm, cada vem mais, se tornando pauta nas discussões de centenas de indústrias brasileiras, onde a tendência clara e identificada é a de investimentos expressivos na melhoria de processos e produtos, por intermédio dessas tecnologias; com foco, sempre que possível, na nacionalização de equipamentos. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo avaliar o modelo proposto por Paul Kennedy (1993) com relação à tendência de Automação e Robotização nas Indústrias Mundiais, analisando o estudo realizado diante de uma economia emergente como a brasileira. Para tanto, foram pesquisadas empresas no Brasil, em diferentes segmentos industriais, o estado da arte em termos de tecnologia de automação e robótica aplicada a processos industriais, e sugerido um modelo diferente do idealizado originalmente por Kennedy. A análise do autor se baseou no teorema que, na matemática discreta, chamamos de “law of the excluded middle”, ou seja, segundo Kennedy, o Brasil estaria vivendo hoje uma migração gradual das indústrias para os países ricos. O Brasil é um exemplo de país industrializado, de economia emergente, que investe intensamente em processos automatizados, mas que não é classificado dentro do grupo desses países ricos. Através da pesquisa realizada será apresentado um novo modelo, no qual países emergentes como o Brasil têm acesso à tecnologia de ponta em automação e robótica, aplicando a mesma em seus processos industriais.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Practice location of physicians: a discrete choice model approach

Economists and policymakers have long been concerned with increasing the supply of health professionals in rural and remote areas. This work seeks to understand which factors influence physicians’ choice of practice location right after completing residency. Differently from previous papers, we analyse the Brazilian missalocation and assess the particularities of developing countries. We use a discrete choice model approach with a multinomial logit specification. Two rich databases are employed containing the location and wage of formally employed physicians as well as details from their post-graduation. Our main findings are that amenities matter, physicians have a strong tendency to remain in the region they completed residency and salaries are significant in the choice of urban, but not rural, communities. We conjecture this is due to attachments built during training and infrastructure concerns.

Bounds on policy relevant parameters with discrete policy variation

When estimating policy parameters, also known as treatment effects, the assignment to treatment mechanism almost always causes endogeneity and thus bias many of these policy parameters estimates. Additionally, heterogeneity in program impacts is more likely to be the norm than the exception for most social programs. In situations where these issues are present, the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) parameter estimation makes use of an instrument to avoid assignment bias and simultaneously to account for heterogeneous effects throughout individuals. Although this parameter is point identified in the literature, the assumptions required for identification may be strong. Given that, we use weaker assumptions in order to partially identify the MTE, i.e. to stablish a methodology for MTE bounds estimation, implementing it computationally and showing results from Monte Carlo simulations. The partial identification we perfom requires the MTE to be a monotone function over the propensity score, which is a reasonable assumption on several economics' examples, and the simulation results shows it is possible to get informative even in restricted cases where point identification is lost. Additionally, in situations where estimated bounds are not informative and the traditional point identification is lost, we suggest a more generic method to point estimate MTE using the Moore-Penrose Pseudo-Invese Matrix, achieving better results than traditional methods.