Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

Estimating Relative Risk Aversion, Risk-Neutral and Real-World Densities using Brazilian Real Currency Options

Building Risk-Neutral Densities (RND) from options data can provide market-implied expectations about the future behavior of a financial variable. And market expectations on financial variables may influence macroeconomic policy decisions. It can be useful also for corporate and financial institutions decision making. This paper uses the Liu et all (2007) approach to estimate the option-implied Risk-neutral densities from the Brazilian Real/US Dollar exchange rate distribution. We then compare the RND with actual exchange rates, on a monthly basis, in order to estimate the relative risk-aversion of investors and also obtain a Real-world density for the exchange rate. We are the first to calculate relative risk-aversion and the option-implied Real World Density for an emerging market currency. Our empirical application uses a sample of Brazilian Real/US Dollar options traded at BM&F-Bovespa from 1999 to 2011. The RND is estimated using a Mixture of Two Log-Normals distribution and then the real-world density is obtained by means of the Liu et al. (2007) parametric risktransformations. The relative risk aversion is calculated for the full sample. Our estimated value of the relative risk aversion parameter is around 2.7, which is in line with other articles that have estimated this parameter for the Brazilian Economy, such as Araújo (2005) and Issler and Piqueira (2000). Our out-of-sample evaluation results showed that the RND has some ability to forecast the Brazilian Real exchange rate. Abe et all (2007) found also mixed results in the out-of-sample analysis of the RND forecast ability for exchange rate options. However, when we incorporate the risk aversion into RND in order to obtain a Real-world density, the out-of-sample performance improves substantially, with satisfactory results in both Kolmogorov and Berkowitz tests. Therefore, we would suggest not using the “pure” RND, but rather taking into account risk aversion in order to forecast the Brazilian Real exchange rate.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Labor supply, risk aversion and economic refrom in China

Economic reform in China has created a small, but fast-growing private sector that has spurred rapid productivity growth. Growth of the private sector is predicated upon continued labor movements away from state-run industries and into private firms. This paper presents a theory of labor market sectoral choice demonstrating that three factors determine private sector labor supply-the difference in wages between the state and private sectors, private sector wage risk and risk aversion. Estimation of the model using survey data provides strong support for the theory. We find that the riskiness of private sector earnings has a greater effect in discouraging workers from taking jobs in private firms than the wage premi um has in attracting workers.

Asymmetric preferences in investment decisions in the Brazilian financial market

The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

Asymetric price adjustment and loss aversion

Ajuste assimétrico de preço é observado em diversos mercados, notavelmente varejo de gasolina: um aumento de custo é passado para os consumidores mais rápido do que uma redução. Eu desenvolvo um modelo de busca dos consumidores que gera essa predição sob aversão à perda. Uma fração dos consumidores ignora os preços no mercado e pode adquirir informação a um custo, o que permite que as firmas tenham lucro com dispersão de preços. Ajuste assimétrico de preço emerge se os consumidores são aversos a perdas em relação a um preço de referência. Custos mais altos tornam os consumidores mais dispostos a procurar, mas também diminui as chances de encontrar preços baixos, gerando uma relação custo-preço convexa.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Avaliando questionários de risco e o comportamento do investidor sobre a ótica de behavioral finance

Tolerância ao risco é fundamental quando se tomam decisões financeiras. No entanto, a avaliação da tolerância ao risco tem se baseado ao longo dos anos em diferentes metodologias, tais como julgamentos heurísticos e a teoria da utilidade esperada que tem como base a hipótese dos mercados eficientes. Foi dentro desta ótica que este trabalho se desenvolveu. O objetivo é analisar três diferentes questionários de avaliação ao risco que são na prática amplamente utilizados por consultores financeiros. Foi assumido para isso que os investidores são considerados racionais, conhecem e ordenam de forma lógica suas preferências, buscam maximizar a "utilidade" de suas escolhas, e conseguem atribuir com precisão probabilidades aos eventos futuros, quando submetidos a escolhas que envolvam incertezas. No entanto, em uma análise preliminar dos questionários, estes poderiam estar utilizando conceitos de behavioral finance para avaliarem a tolerância ao risco, ao invés de utilizarem somente a metodologia tradicional da teoria da utilidade esperada. Dessa forma tornou-se necessário o estudo dos conceitos de behavioral finance. O primeiro capítulo então trata dos aspectos psicológicos do investidor, procurando entender como este se comporta e como este forma suas preferências. Apesar do estudo assumir racionalidade nas decisões, se a teoria de behavioral estiver correta e os investidores apresentarem desvios a racionalidade, como a teoria prospectiva afirma, o questionário poderia ser o veículo ideal para identificar tais desvios, sendo possível então educar e orientar o indivíduo em suas escolhas financeiras, afim de maximizá-las. O capitulo dois coloca a análise dos questionários inserida no contexto da teoria moderna de finanças, falando das escolhas de portfólio para investidores de longo prazo. O capítulo mostra de forma bem resumida e simplificada como o investidor maximiza a sua utilidade da riqueza. A idéia desse capítulo é entender como alguns julgamentos heurísticos assumidos na prática por consultores financeiros afetam as escolhas de portfólio e em quais condições esses julgamentos heurísticos são verdadeiros. Isso se torna importante pois os questionários mesclam medidas de risco com horizonte de investimentos do investidor. Estes questionários são utilizados para traçar uma política de investimentos completa para o investidor. Para cada perfil de risco encontrado a instituição traça um modelo de alocação de portfólio. O capítulo três trata da avaliação dos questionários em si tendo como base a teoria da utilidade esperada, os conceitos de behaviral finance e as lições tiradas das escolhas de portfólio para investidores de longo prazo.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Estimating the stochastic discount factor without a utility function

Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the serial-correlation ìcommon featureîin every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns, does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences, is suitable for testing di§erent preference speciÖcations or investigating intertemporal substitution puzzles, and can be a basis to construct an estimator of the risk-free rate. For post-war data, our estimator is close to unity most of the time, yielding an average annual real discount rate of 2.46%. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference speciÖcations used in the literature and estimates of the relative risk-aversion coe¢ cient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. Using our SDF estimator, we found little signs of the equity-premium puzzle for the U.S.

Estimando a aversão ao risco, a taxa de desconto intertemporal, e a substutibilidade intertemporal do consumo no Brasil usando três tipos de função utilidade

Nesse trabalho estima-se, usando o método generalizado dos momentos e dados brasileiros, os parâmetros estruturais do modelo CCAPM (consumption capital asset pricing model) a partir de três classes de funções utilidade distintas: função utilidade potência (CRRA), utilidade com hábito externo, e aversão ao desapontamento (Kreps-Porteus). Estes parâmetros estruturais estão associados à aversão ao risco, à elasticidade de substituição intertemporal no consumo e à taxa de desconto intertemporal da utilidade futura. Os resultados aqui obtidos são analisados e comparados com resultados anteriores para dados brasileiros e americanos. Adicionalmente, testa-se econometricamente todos os modelos estruturais estimados a partir do teste de restrições de sobre-identificação, para investigar, da forma mais abrangente possível, se há ou não equity premium puzzle para o Brasil. Os resultados surpreendem, dado que, em raríssimas ocasiões, se rejeita as restrições implícitas nesses modelos. Logo, conclui-se que não há equity premium puzzle para o Brasil.

Laws of large numbers for non-additive probabilities

We apply the concept of exchangeable random variables to the case of non-additive robability distributions exhibiting ncertainty aversion, and in the lass generated bya convex core convex non-additive probabilities, ith a convex core). We are able to rove two versions of the law of arge numbers (de Finetti's heorems). By making use of two efinitions. of independence we rove two versions of the strong law f large numbers. It turns out that e cannot assure the convergence of he sample averages to a constant. e then modal the case there is a true" probability distribution ehind the successive realizations of the uncertain random variable. In this case convergence occurs. This result is important because it renders true the intuition that it is possible "to learn" the "true" additive distribution behind an uncertain event if one repeatedly observes it (a sufficiently large number of times). We also provide a conjecture regarding the "Iearning" (or updating) process above, and prove a partia I result for the case of Dempster-Shafer updating rule and binomial trials.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.