5 resultados para Direct Activity Exchange

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

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Exchange rates are important macroeconomic prices and changes in these rates a ect economic activity, prices, interest rates, and trade ows. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that the global vector autoregressions model (GVAR) proposed by Pesaran and co-authors can add relevant information to the literature on measuring exchange rate misalignment. Our empirical exercise suggests that the estimate exchange rate misalignment obtained from GVAR can be quite di erent to that using the traditional cointegrated time series techniques, which treat countries as detached entities. The di erences between the two approaches are more pronounced for small and developing countries. Our results also suggest a strong interdependence among eurozone countries, as expected

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Real exchange rate is an important macroeconomic price in the economy and a ects economic activity, interest rates, domestic prices, trade and investiments ows among other variables. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that it is possible to calculate the misalignment from a mixed ointegrated vector error correction framework. An empirical exercise using United States' real exchange rate data is performed. The results suggest that the model with mixed frequency data is preferred to the models with same frequency variables

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OBJECTIVE: To analyze lifestyle risk factors related to direct healthcare costs and the indirect costs due to sick leave among workers of an airline company in Brazil. METHODS: In this longitudinal 12-month study of 2,201 employees of a Brazilian airline company, the costs of sick leave and healthcare were the primary outcomes of interest. Information on the independent variables, such as gender, age, educational level, type of work, stress, and lifestyle-related factors (body mass index, physical activity, and smoking), was collected using a questionnaire on enrolment in the study. Data on sick leave days were available from the company register, and data on healthcare costs were obtained from insurance records. Multivariate linear regression analysis was used to investigate the association between direct and indirect healthcare costs with sociodemographic, work, and lifestyle-related factors. RESULTS: Over the 12-month study period, the average direct healthcare expenditure per worker was US$505.00 and the average indirect cost because of sick leave was US$249.00 per worker. Direct costs were more than twice the indirect costs and both were higher in women. Body mass index was a determinant of direct costs and smoking was a determinant of indirect costs. CONCLUSIONS: Obesity and smoking among workers in a Brazilian airline company were associated with increased health costs. Therefore, promoting a healthy diet, physical activity, and anti-tobacco campaigns are important targets for health promotion in this study population.

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How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.