O apelo ecológico na propaganda como fator de influência na atitude de compra do consumidor: um estudo experimental

Este estudo examinou o apelo ecológico utilizado na propaganda como influenciador na atitude de compra do consumidor, tendo em vista que nas duas últimas décadas houve um crescimento nos anúncios que utilizam este tipo de apelo, demonstrando que, pelo surgimento de um novo nicho de mercado, empresas têm se valido do marketing verde e da influência normativa na sua estratégia de marketing. Buscou-se investigar se efetivamente o uso do apelo ecológico na propaganda influencia positivamente na intenção de compra do consumidor. A fundamentação teórica sobre o tema foi desenvolvida a partir dos estudos sobre comportamento do consumidor, atitudes em relação à propaganda, psicologia social e outros ligados ao tema. Esta fundamentação gerou algumas propostas conceituais, traduzidas em um conjunto de hipóteses, que, por se tratar de uma pesquisa causal, foram testadas por meio de metodologia experimental entre sujeitos, com oito níveis de manipulação, uma amostra não probabilística, formada por 215 estudantes de pós-graduação na cidade de Curitiba, e aplicação de questionário estruturado, constituído de perguntas fechadas e respostas escalonadas não-comparativas, intervalar do tipo diferencial semântico, com sete categorias. Os resultados obtidos indicaram que o apelo ecológico utilizado na propaganda como argumento de venda não gerou uma resposta significativamente mais favorável na intenção de compra; contudo, em relação à intenção de compra, o apelo ecológico na propaganda gerou uma atitude significativamente mais favorável do que a atitude em relação à marca, e uma atitude menos favorável do que a atitude em relação ao preço. Os resultados também indicaram que o consumidor não está disposto a pagar um preço maior por um produto anunciado com apelo ecológico de venda. Sugestões de pesquisa futura são comentadas à luz da teoria de marketing.

Um método de linearização local com passo adaptativo para solução numérica de equações diferenciais estocásticas com ruído aditivo

Neste trabalho apresentamos um novo método numérico com passo adaptativo baseado na abordagem de linearização local, para a integração de equações diferenciais estocásticas com ruído aditivo. Propomos, também, um esquema computacional que permite a implementação eficiente deste método, adaptando adequadamente o algorítimo de Padé com a estratégia “scaling-squaring” para o cálculo das exponenciais de matrizes envolvidas. Antes de introduzirmos a construção deste método, apresentaremos de forma breve o que são equações diferenciais estocásticas, a matemática que as fundamenta, a sua relevância para a modelagem dos mais diversos fenômenos, e a importância da utilização de métodos numéricos para avaliar tais equações. Também é feito um breve estudo sobre estabilidade numérica. Com isto, pretendemos introduzir as bases necessárias para a construção do novo método/esquema. Ao final, vários experimentos numéricos são realizados para mostrar, de forma prática, a eficácia do método proposto, e compará-lo com outros métodos usualmente utilizados.

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Dynamic hedging with stocastic differential utility

In this paper we study the dynamic hedging problem using three different utility specifications: stochastic differential utility, terminal wealth utility, and we propose a particular utility transformation connecting both previous approaches. In all cases, we assume Markovian prices. Stochastic differential utility, SDU, impacts the pure hedging demand ambiguously, but decreases the pure speculative demand, because risk aversion increases. We also show that consumption decision is, in some sense, independent of hedging decision. With terminal wealth utility, we derive a general and compact hedging formula, which nests as special all cases studied in Duffie and Jackson (1990). We then show how to obtain their formulas. With the third approach we find a compact formula for hedging, which makes the second-type utility framework a particular case, and show that the pure hedging demand is not impacted by this specification. In addition, with CRRA- and CARA-type utilities, the risk aversion increases and, consequently the pure speculative demand decreases. If futures price are martingales, then the transformation plays no role in determining the hedging allocation. We also derive the relevant Bellman equation for each case, using semigroup techniques.

Equilibria in exchange economies with financial constraints : beyond the Cass trick

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financiaI markets with purely financiaI securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass [4], Duffie [7] and Florenzano-Gourdel [12] proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium security prices. This result is based on a trick initiated by Cass [4] in which one unconstrained agent behaves as if he were in complete markets. This approach is unsatisfactory since it is asymmetric and no more valid when every agent is subject to frictions. We propose a new and symmetric approach to prove that arbitrage-free security prices still fully characterize equilibrium security prices in the more realistic situation where the financiaI market is constrained by convex restrictions, provided that financiaI markets are collectively frictionless.

Joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with projected linear decision rules

We consider multistage stochastic linear optimization problems combining joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with hard constraints. We develop a method for projecting decision rules onto hard constraints of wait-and-see type. We establish the relation between the original (in nite dimensional) problem and approximating problems working with projections from di erent subclasses of decision policies. Considering the subclass of linear decision rules and a generalized linear model for the underlying stochastic process with noises that are Gaussian or truncated Gaussian, we show that the value and gradient of the objective and constraint functions of the approximating problems can be computed analytically.