Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

On the differentiability of the consumer demand function

For strictly quasi concave differentiable utility functions, demand is shown to be differentiable almost everywhere if marginal utilities are pointwise Lipschitzian. For concave utility functions, demand is differentiable almost everywhere in the case of differentiable additively separable utility or in the case of quasi-linear utility.

Inada conditions imply that production function must be asymptotically Cobb-Douglas

We show that every twice-continuously differentiable and strictly concave function f : R+ → R+ can be bracketed between two C.E.S. functions at each open interval. In particular, for the Inada conditions to hold, a production function must be asymptotically Cobb-Douglas.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.