Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Ditadura e justiça militar no Brasil : a atuação do Superior Tribunal Militar (1964-1980)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a atuação do Superior Tribunal Militar (STM), segunda instância da Justiça Militar brasileira, entre os anos de 1964 e 1980, no processo de construção de uma nova ordem jurídica e no julgamento de crimes militares, políticos e político-militares. Após o golpe de 31 de março de 1964, o STM teve importante participação no processo de punição jurídico-política então instaurado. Com a edição do Ato Institucional nº 2, em 1965, o julgamento de crimes contra a segurança nacional foi transferido para a Justiça Militar, buscando reordenar problemas gerados pelo emaranhado legislativo que definia até então as atribuições do STM e do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) no julgamento de delitos vinculados à conjuntura política “revolucionária”. Segundo a metodologia adotada neste trabalho, a Justiça Militar como um todo, e o STM em particular, atuaram nesse período por meio de três lógicas distintas: como Justiça corporativa (JC), ou seja, julgando crimes militares; como Justiça do regime (JR), direcionada para o processo e julgamento de opositores do regime, em casos de atentado contra a segurança nacional e contra a probidade administrativa; e como justiça político-corporativa (JPC), julgando incriminados em delitos militares, mas por motivação política. Ao longo da tese, buscamos também acompanhar a maneira como o Tribunal se comportou frente às mudanças políticas e jurídicas, que incidiram em sua estrutura e competência. Como demonstramos no trabalho, o impacto da produção legislativa sobre o labor do STM não foi imediato. A morosidade da justiça e a dinâmica processual geraram um descompasso temporal entre as propostas governamentais de modificação da estrutura jurídica e os julgamentos. Uma das consequências diretas desse fenômeno foi o fato de o STM, principalmente ao atuar como Justiça do regime, ter que lidar, ao mesmo tempo, com leis de segurança nacional que se superpunham e coabitavam o mesmo campo jurídico. Verificamos, ainda, que o padrão decisório do STM ao julgar em cada uma das categorias tendia a reproduzir as decisões das Auditorias Militares, dado esse que nos permite relativizar a difundida tese de que o Tribunal atuou como um espaço de maior serenidade e complacência para com os condenados em primeira instância.

Labor legislation and the size of informal sector in Brazil

This paper studies the increase in the rate of informal workers in the Brazilian economy that occurred between 1985 and 1999. We develop an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We calibrate it to match some features of the Brazilian economy for 1985. We conduct a policy experiment which reproduces the 1988 constitution reforms that increased the retirement benefits and labor costs in the formal sector. We show that these reforms can explain the increase in informal labor. Then, we conduct a policy experiment and analyze its impact on the Brazilian economy.