Uma interpretação da psicogênese e da sociogênese do desenvolvimento moral

O objetivo deste estudo volta-se para uma análise a nível teórico,da construção de normas. constitutivas do sistema moral aptas a direcionarem a conduta humana. Três referenciais básicos foram estabelecidos como pla taformas para o estudo: A Crítica da Razão Prática de I. Kant e a avaliação do caráter neces5ário da norma. bem como a dificuldade de transpor para o plano histórico e empírico. critérios de universalidade inerentes ao "imperativo categórico". A categorização dos valores de E. Spranger forneceu elementos para proceder a uma análise da sociogênese das normas, partindo de critérios valorativos. culturalmente estabelecidos, aptos a quantificar conteúdos para a moral. Finalmente. a perspectiva piagetiana ofereceu as bases para uma avaliação da psicogênese como construção formal dos sistemas de regras, que compõem a moral humana. O estudo aqui realizado estabelece seus próprios limites dentro dos três contextos acima selecionados por constituirem uma interpretação prefixada que viza harmonizar tais posiçoes. Estas fronteiras. assim definidas. justificam portanto o caráter circunscrito. e sem pretensões de ser exaustivo na matéria que o presente trabalho se propõe evidenciar.

Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, non-monotonic equilibria might happen. When the necessary and sufficient conditions are not satisfied, there are ties with positive probability. In such case, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule. As a direct implication of these results, we obtain a generalization of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. From the robustness of equilibrium existence for all-pay auctions in multidimensional setting, an interpretation of our results can give a new justification to the use of tournaments in practice.

Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.

The indetermination of senior (or the indetermination of Wagner) and Schmoller as a Social Economist

The propositions of pure economics, whatever be their generality and their truth, do not authorize normative concluaions, but cannot be ignored. The latter, namely what ought not to be done, is derivable from socio-economics. The derivation is to be qualified by the specificities of the case. I have called this the Indetermination of Senior; Wagner and Marshall were quite aware of it. The habit of ignoring it is the Ricardian Vice; Schmoller's fight may have been a reaction against the latter. The Methodenstreit was the first great paradigmatic conflict between pure and social economists.