Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

Comparison and analysis of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports of the top five companies ranked on the 2013 CSR RepTrak

In the 1970s, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was discussed by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman in his article “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” (Friedman, 1970). His view on CSR was contemptuous as he referred to it as “hypocritical window-dressing” a reflection of the view of Corporate America on CSR back then. For a long time short-term maximization of shareholder value was the only maxim for top management across industries and companies. Over the last decade, CSR has become a more important and relevant factor of a company’s reputation, shifting the discussion from whether CSR is necessary to how best CSR commitments should be done (Smith, 2003). Inevitably, companies do have an environmental, social and economic impact, thereby imposing social costs on current and future generations. In 2013, 50 of the world biggest companies have been responsible for 73 percent of the total carbon dioxide (CO2) emission (Global 500 Climate Change Report 2013). Post et al. (2002) refer to these social costs as a company’s need to retain its “license to operate”. In the late 1990s, CSR reporting was nearly unknown, which drastically changed during the last decade. Allen White, co-founder of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), said that CSR reporting”… has evolved from the extraordinary to the exceptional to the expected” (Confino, 2013). In confirmation of this, virtually all of the world’s largest 250 companies report on CSR (93%) and reporting by now appears to be business standard (KPMG, 2013). CSR reports are a medium for transparency which may lead to an improved company reputation (Noked, 2013; Thorne et al, 2008; Wilburn and Wilburn, 2013). In addition, it may be used as part of an ongoing shareholder relations campaign, which may prevent shareholders from submitting Environmental and Social (E&S)1 proposals (Noked, 2013), based on an Ernst & Young report 1 The top five E&S proposal topic areas in 2013 were: 1. Political spending/ lobbying; 2. Environmental sustainability; 3. Corporate diversity/ EEO; 4.Labor/ human rights and 5. Animal testing/ animal welfare. Three groups of environmental sustainability proposal topics of sub-category number two (environmental sustainability) 6 2013, representing the largest category of shareholder proposals submitted. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) even goes as far as to claim that CSR reports are “…becoming critical to a company’s credibility, transparency and endurance.” (PwC, 2013).

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.