Cyclical Interest Payments on Inside Money

Rio de Janeiro

Inflation and debt indexation : the equivalence of two alternative schemes for the case of periodic payments

The presence of inflation has induced the financial institutions to implement procedures devised to protect the real values of theirs loans. Two of such procedurcs, the floaaing rale scheme and the monetary correction mechanism, tend to lead to very different streams of payments. However, whenever the floating rate scheme follows the rule of Strict adhercnce to lhe Fisher equation, lhe two procedures are financially equivalent.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Sources of payments practices rigidity

This paper studies the joint determination of the wage payments period between firms and employees. The aggregate timeseries analysis reaches two conclusions: a) the average payments period keep an equilibrium relationship with the previous inflation peak, this indicates some degree of irreversibility of payments practices. b) the low previous inflation peak .;:;_asticity of ave r age payments periods reveal.s a high degree of rigidity of payments practices.The framework developed in the paper incorporates the fol.l.owing sources of payments practices rigidity: a)interactions between optimal. payments period decisions and optimal. number of trips to the bank. b)the occurrence of Pare to inneficiencies in the bargaining process between firms and empl.oyees due to wage regulation. c) integer restrictions on payments frequencies produced by upper bounds on the payments period. The empirical. part of the paper assesses the rel.evance of these different sources of payments practices rigidity using Brazil.ian micro data.

Balance of payments dominance: its implications for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate policies, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.

Balance of payments dominance : its implocations for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate flexibility, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.